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One of the biggest problems facing the world today is the degradation of our natural envi-
ronment. This degradation is mainly due to human behavior (Stern, 2000). because of this, 
there is ample pressure on social scientists to develop instruments that are effective in 
altering human behavior in a more pro-environmental direction. This thesis deals with 
that issue. More specifically, in this thesis I will investigate a specific instrument aimed 
at altering environmental behavior: the making of public commitments. I will show that 
commitment making is an effective instrument for improving actual conservation behavior, 
investigate the conditions under which people are willing to make commitments, and I will 
describe in detail the processes through which commitment making may alter behavior. The 
goal of this thesis is to provide a perspective on the entire process of commitment making. 
by doing so, I hope to contribute to the improvement of public commitment making as a tool 
to promote pro-environmental behavior.
This thesis consists of both field and laboratory studies. The research conducted was 
part of the NwO funded program “Feedback, social support and public commitment to 
improve environmental quality of farm lands”. Therefore, the field studies focus on nature 
conservation practiced by arable farmers. In this introductory chapter, I will first describe 
and explain these nature conservation practices. After that I will describe the background 
of this research project by reviewing the social psychological literature on interventions 
focussing on environmental behaviors. Then, I will formulate the research questions under-
lying this project. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis and an overview of its chap-
ters.
Farmers and nature conservation
by adopting nature conservation practices, farmers can increase the environmental qual-
ity of their farm lands. These conservation practices usually consist of reducing emissions 
of agrochemicals and fertilizer to the environment, as well as the management and main-
tenance of semi-natural habitats such as riparian zones, swamps and other small scale 
landscape elements. An example quite typical for the Netherlands is the creation of field 
margins: Strips of land lying between arable land and the field boundary which are delib-
erately managed to create conditions that benefit biodiversity. Such nature conservation 
practices have been officially acknowledged by the EU Common Agricultural policy (CAP) 
since the early 1990s (European Commission, Directorate-General for agriculture, 2003). 
Most European countries now offer farmers the possibility to partake in so-called agri-
environmental schemes in which farmers are financially rewarded for their conservation 
efforts. These agri-environmental schemes are considered a key policy instrument for 
governments to enhance the quality of the natural environment (burton, 2006). In addition, 







It has been recognized that these agri-environmental schemes are not always effective in 
changing farmers’ attitudes and behavior concerning conservation (burton, 2006). In the 
current thesis and especially in Chapters 2 and 3, I will describe studies that investigate the 
relevant aspects of farmers’ motivation to engage in nature conservation practices and how 
these practices can be improved.
Environmental intervention research
within the social psychological literature there is a vast amount of research dealing with 
interventions aimed at altering environmental behaviors (for reviews, see Abrahamse, Steg, 
Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005; De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993). Interventions usually focus 
at household behaviors such as recycling and energy saving. One technique that seems par-
ticularly promising is the making of public commitments whereby an individual is asked to 
publicly commit to a certain behavior. It seems that people are likely to adhere to previously 
made commitments. Several studies have shown that commitment making is effective in, 
for instance, increasing recycling (burn & Oskamp, 1986; DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995; wang & 
Katzev, 1990), energy saving (Pallak & Cummings, 1976), and choosing public transport over 
car use (Matthies et al., 2006). The details of this process whereby commitment influences 
behavior will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Another technique that has often been applied in intervention research is the presen-
tation of information. This can be and is done in several different ways. Information can 
be given about general environmental issues or about specific problems and their solu-
tions. Information can consist of feedback, whereby people are confronted with their cur-
rent behavior, possibly compared to that of others. Feedback can be combined with advices 
on how to improve current behavior. These advices can vary in the extent to which they are 
tailored to the individual. In general, providing information serves to create awareness of 
the current behavior and to increase knowledge that is needed to change that behavior 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005). In respect to the latter function, it seems plausible to assume that 
the more tailored the information given is, the more it will result in change at the behavioral 
level. In Chapter 3, we will combine tailored information and public commitment making in 
an intervention aimed at improving farmers’ nature conservation practices.
Overview of the current dissertation
The central question of this thesis is if and how commitment can be used to improve 
en vironmental behavior. below I will describe the different chapters and how they contri-
bute to answering the central research questions. while Chapters 2 and 3 focus specifically 
on Dutch farmers, Chapters 4 and 5 address commitment making in general.
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Chapter 2: A Social-Cognitive Explanation Of Motivational Differences Between 
Farmers’ Non-Subsidized And Subsidized Nature Conservation Practices
In this chapter I focus on the social psychological underpinnings of nature conservation 
performed by farmers. In a subsequent chapter I will argue that these underpinnings can 
be influenced by a commitment manipulation, but in this chapter the emphasis will be on 
the current motivation farmers experience when it comes to nature conservation. In order 
to successfully alter behavior and its motivation using a commitment manipulation it is 
essential to develop knowledge about this behavior. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to 
investigating the motivation to perform nature conservation, using the Theory of Planned 
behavior, to which the concepts of self-identity and personal norms were added. A dis-
tinction is made between nature conservation practices done on a non-subsidized basis 
and nature conservation practices for which farmers receive some form of remuneration 
from the Dutch government. 85 Arable farmers participated in this survey study. Results 
show that the model explains more variance in the intention to perform non-subsidized than 
subsidized nature conservation practices. Also, the concept of self-identity seems to affect 
intention to perform non-subsidized but not subsidized nature conservation practices. The 
results suggest that aside from a reward-based motivation, farmers can simultaneously 
have an identity-based motivation to engage in nature conservation practices. Increasing 
farmers’ self-identity as conservationists therefore seems a promising way to improve their 
nature conservation efforts.
Chapter 3: Using Tailored Information and Public Commitment to Improve the 
Environmental Quality of Farm Lands
This chapter focuses on improving farmers’ nature conservation efforts described in Chap-
ter 3. An intervention is developed and tested that combined tailored information and pub-
lic commitment. Participating farmers were divided in three groups: one group received 
tailored information only, one group received both tailored information and a public com-
mitment manipulation, and one group served as a control. A questionnaire measuring rele-
vant aspects of conservation was filled out before and after the intervention took place. 
Results show that especially tailored information combined with public commitment mak-
ing resulted in a stronger desire to engage in conservation, an increase in surface area of 
non-subsidized natural habitat, and an increase in time farmers spent on conservation. 
The intervention affected both subsidized and non-subsidized conservation, but the effects 








Reflections on the previous studies and a preview of the next chapters
As mentioned earlier, Chapters 2 and 3 were performed as part of the NwO funded pro-
gram “Feedback, social support and public commitment to improve environmental quality 
of farm lands”. Two years were spent on conducting these studies and designing the tai-
lored information and commitment intervention. while commitment making had been used 
previously as an intervention tool to stimulate pro-environmental behavior, the process 
whereby commitment making changes behavior was still for a large part unknown. Further 
investigation of this concept was clearly needed. Specifically, what needed clarification was 
a) what determines people’s willingness to make commitments, and b) how exactly these 
commitments affect subsequent behavior. I sought to answer these questions in the follow-
ing chapters.
The conditions under which people are willing to make commitments had, to the best of 
my knowledge, not yet been addressed in social psychological research. This is surprising, 
since the success of any commitment intervention is highly dependent on people’s willing-
ness to take part in it. In fact, the effectiveness of commitment making is rendered use-
less unless people make such commitments. Therefore, a new perspective on commitment 
making was needed, which I will further explain in Chapter 4.
To answer my second question, I reviewed the literature on commitment making. There 
are several studies that have tested the effect of commitment on environmental behavior 
(see, for instance, burn & Oskamp, 1986; Pardini & Katzev, 1984; and wang & Katzev, 1990). 
However, they had not yet been systematically documented (but see Katzev & wang, 1994). 
Furthermore, what was lacking was a theoretical framework through which the effect of 
commitment making on behavior could be interpreted. Therefore, I performed a literature 
study that is described in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I turn to fundamental research on social 
influence to propose three ways through which commitment may alter behavior. I review 
studies that apply commitment making to increase environmental behaviors and investigate 
to what extent they offer evidence for these processes.
by following these two pathways I aim to provide the reader with a more complete pic-
ture of the ways commitment making can be used to change behavior.
Chapter 4: Public Commitment Making as a Structural Solution in Social 
Dilemmas
Environmental behaviors such as nature conservation described in this dissertation are, 
in essence, social dilemmas. Such dilemmas are characterized by a conflict of interests 
between the individual and the group: what is best for the individual leads to a negative 
outcome for the group, and vice versa. A specific dilemma is that of the provision of a public 
good, whereby group members are asked to contribute to a good that, upon realization, will 
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be enjoyed by all group members regardless of their contribution. In this situation it is highly 
attractive for individual group members not to contribute, since chances are the public good 
will be realized any way, and they will be able to enjoy it without having to bear the costs 
of contributing. Such behavior is called free riding. In these dilemmas, contributing for the 
public good is called cooperation, while behavior for the sake of the individual is called defec-
tion (for overviews, see Komorita & Parks, 1995; weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).
Seen from this perspective, trying to increase environmental behaviors is in fact  trying 
to increase cooperation. Research has shown that the making of public commitments 
increases cooperation (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). what remains unknown, however, 
is under which conditions people are willing to make such commitments. based on the lit-
erature on structural solutions to social dilemmas, I expected dispositional trust and situa-
tional expectations to determine the willingness to install a system of public commitments. 
In this chapter I will present two studies which both show that group members who are low 
in dispositional trust are likely to invest in a system of commitments when their situational 
expectations concerning other group members’ contributions are high. On the other hand, 
group members who are high in dispositional trust are likely to invest in a system of com-
mitments when their situational expectations concerning other group members’ contribu-
tions are low. It appears that both low trusters with high situational expectations and high 
trusters with low situational expectations choose for a system of public commitments in 
order to gain maximal joint outcomes.
Chapter 5: A Review of Commitment Making Strategies in Environmental 
Research
In this chapter I offer a critical review concerning commitment making as an intervention 
strategy in the environmental domain. Commitment making is commonly regarded as an 
effective way to promote several pro-environmental behaviors (Abrahamse et al., 2005; 
Katzev & wang, 1994; De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993). The assumption is that when 
people make a commitment to engage in a certain behavior, they adhere to that commit-
ment and this produces behavior change. while this idea seems promising, the results are 
mixed. Also, it remains unclear why people would be inclined to adhere to previously made 
commitments. In this chapter a structured review of environmental studies containing a 
commitment manipulation is presented. I also investigate the possible psychological con-
structs that underlie the commitment effect: self-concept, need for consistency and social 
and personal norms. by doing so I aim to clarify how commitment can be successful. I 
conclude that while commitment itself has been found to change behavior, it is more often 
effective in combination with other treatments. I notice a gap between fundamental and 
applied psychological research in that researchers in the applied domain do not always 







making as a potentially useful technique which could be improved by following up on find-
ings from fundamental research.
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion
In this 6th and final chapter I will briefly summarize the major findings presented in this 
dissertation and I will elaborate on the general conclusions that can be drawn from these 
results. Also I will discuss the relevant practical implications of the current research, and 
offer some suggestions for future research on the making of commitments in the environ-
mental domain.
To conclude, the central goal of this dissertation is to investigate if and how commitment 
making can be used to alter environmental behavior. More specifically, in the first chap-
ters, I focus on conservation behavior as performed by Dutch farmers. I will study farmers’ 
motivation for nature conservation practices, and test whether commitment making can 
improve these practices. These chapters are followed by two more general chapters on 
commitment making in which I will investigate the conditions under which people are willing 
to make commitments, and describe the processes through which commitment making can 
affect environmental behavior in general. by doing so, I aim to provide a perspective on the 
entire process of commitment making. Ultimately, I hope this will contribute to the effec-
tiveness of commitment making as a tool to promote pro-environmental behavior.
An important ending note to the reader: All of the chapters in this dissertation are papers 
submitted for publication. Therefore, they have been written in the first-person plural and 
can be read independently of each other.
Chapter 2  
 
A Social-Cognitive Explanation Of 
Motivational Differences Between Farmers’ 
Subsidized And Non-Subsidized Nature 
Conservation Practices1
1 This chapter is based on Lokhorst, Van Dijk, Staats, Van Dijk, & De Snoo (2009a) and is therefore written in the 
first- person plural
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biodiversity is decreasing at an alarmingly high rate (world Resources Institute, 2005). It 
is generally recognized that in order to solve the environmental problems facing the world 
today, human behavior is key (Stern & Oskamp, 1987). Numerous psychological studies 
have investigated how to change peoples’ behavior in more environmentally friendly ways 
(for reviews, see Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005; De Young, 1993; Dwyer et 
al., 1993). Those studies include for instance recycling (e.g. DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995), envi-
ronmental household behaviors (e.g. Harland, Staats & wilke, 1999), and choosing public 
transport over car use (e.g. Matthies, Klockner & Preissner, 2006). Typically, the behav-
iors studied are consumer behaviors: performed more or less by all members of society 
and relatively easy to execute. However, Gardner and Stern (2002) argue that psychologists 
studying interventions in the environmental domain should be very careful in selecting their 
target behaviors: The research focus should be on those behaviors that have the greatest 
effect on our environment.
Given the large areas of land in agricultural use, farmers’ behavior and decision-making 
regarding sustainability and conservation issues have an extraordinary large influence on 
biodiversity. In this context, it is remarkable that this group has been somewhat overlooked 
in social psychological research.
There is only a small body of research on farmers’ attitudes and behaviors regarding 
nature conservation, and this research rarely makes use of social psychological insights 
or theories. Often, research on agricultural decision-making is qualitative (e.g. Herzon & 
Mikk, 2007), which is problematic for comparative analysis. when quantitative instruments 
such as large scale questionnaires are applied, there is a tendency to measure only farm-
ers’ attitudes, and not other constructs that might very well influence behavior (Van der 
Meulen, De Snoo & wossink, 1996; burton, 2004). Researchers often ask about farmers’ 
motivations directly, giving them a few options to choose from. These answers are then 
used for cluster analyses to form typologies of farmers (e.g. Morris & Potter, 1995; wilson 
& Hart, 2000). while these results may look appealing to for instance policy makers, we 
believe there is a deeper insight to be gained when behavioral models that specify relations 
between relevant variables are applied. Grouping participants and their motivations into 
distinct types means that these motivations exclude each other, while behavioral models 
assume motivations are continua on which participants can score relatively low or high and 
that are not by definition incompatible with each other. To the best of our knowledge, only 
the work done by Fielding and colleagues (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Fielding, 
Terry, Masser, bordia & Hogg, 2005) has applied such models. In concordance with burton 
(2004), we therefore advocate a more systematic use of social psychological models such 
as the Theory of Planned behavior in agricultural research, and the addition of norma-
tive influences and self-identity to those models. It is our goal in this research to study 







 psychology and in this way contribute to a better understanding of the process that lead 
farmers to invest in nature conservation.
Farmers’ conservation efforts usually consist of reducing emissions of pesticides and 
fertilizer to the environment, as well as the management and maintenance of semi-natural 
habitats such as field margins, riparian zones, hedges and other small scale landscape 
elements (for example boatman et al., 1999). In recognition of the value of such efforts 
for biodiversity conservation in rural areas, many European countries have set up subsidy 
schemes to promote farmer conservation activities. These so-called agri-environmental 
schemes also stimulate farmers to set aside part of their productive area for the creation 
of semi-natural habitats for conservation purposes. The offered subsidies come with an 
extensive set of rules and regulations regarding size and management of these habitats; 
minimum standards farmers are required to comply with.
In addition, farmers have the possibility to perform nature conservation practices on a 
non-subsidized basis. The natural elements derived from such practices are not compen-
sated for by any monetary rewards. It seems plausible that different underlying processes 
are at stake here. If a farmer can get compensated for one kind of natural element or prac-
tice, then why spend energy on other kinds? For subsidized nature conservation practices, 
it can be expected that the monetary reward is of prime interest; hence living up to the 
rules of the subsidy regulation to obtain the allowance can be identified as an important 
motivation for these conservation practices. Non-subsidized conservation however, is inde-
pendent of a monetary goal and can therefore be expected to be related to more intrinsic 
conservation motives.
From a policy perspective it seems important to reward behavior that is believed to be 
desirable. From a social psychological perspective, however, monetary rewards can be det-
rimental and may actually backfire instead of producing the desired increase in behavior. As 
numerous studies have shown (for a meta-analysis, see Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999), behav-
ior that is rewarded runs the risk of losing its intrinsic motivation. when people are rewarded 
for performing a behavior they attribute their motivation to this reward and thus come to think 
of themselves as extrinsically motivated. This attribution might then lead them to stop per-
forming the behavior when the monetary reward is taken away. This possible reduce in effort 
caused by an external reward has been named the crowding out effect (Frey, 1997).
Previous research (wilson & Hart, 2000) has shown that although financial rewards are 
an important reason for farmers to participate in nature conservation practices, there is a 
recent tendency for farmers to express more conservation-oriented motivations. wilson 
and Hart call this “the new hypothesis” and argue that these concerns for conservation do 
not exclude the importance of the financial imperative. However, they argue that this “new 
hypothesis” deserves attention from researchers interested in environmental attitudes and 
behaviors among farmers.
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In this study, we will take a closer look at farmers’ motivation to participate in nature con-
servation practices. Our focus will be on the differences between subsidized and non-sub-
sidized practices. we will examine these possible different underlying social psychological 
constructs using a social-cognitive model based on the Theory of Planned behavior (Azjen, 
1991).
Theory of Planned Behavior
The Theory of Planned behavior, or TPb, is perhaps the most influential and well-known 
social psychological model to predict human behavior. A plethora of research (for a review, 
see Armitage & Conner, 2001) has shown that it is capable of predicting a wide range of 
behaviors, for example donating to charity (Smith & McSweeney, 2007), recycling behavior 
(e.g. Terry, Hogg and white, 1999), environmental household behaviors (Harland, Staats 
and wilke, 1999), and landholders’ riparian zone management practices (Fielding, Terry, 
Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Fielding, Terry, Massar, bordia & Hogg, 2005).
The TPb states that the most proximal predictor of any given behavior is the intention to 
perform that behavior. The intention to perform can be predicted by the three other compo-
nents of the model: the attitude towards the behavior, the subjective norm and the perceived 
behavioral control (PbC). Attitude is described as an individual’s evaluation of the specific 
behavior: it is a personal evaluation of whether the behavior is positive or negative (Azjen 
& Fishbein, 1980). Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure to perform a certain 
behavior. It reflects the extent to which a person thinks relevant others believe the actor 
should perform the behavior. PbC reflects how easy or difficult the individual thinks it will 
be to perform the behavior.
Ajzen (1991) has stated that ‘the theory of planned behavior is, in principle, open to the inclu-
sion of additional predictors if it can be shown that they capture a significant proportion of the 
variance in intention or behavior’ after the original TPb variables have been taken into account. 
In fact, several studies have been conducted in which new constructs have been successfully 
added to the model, thereby increasing its explanatory power (for an overview focusing on 
environmentally relevant behaviors, see Staats, 2003). In the current study, we have therefore 
added two constructs to the TPb model, for which we expected an increase of explanatory 
power for the behavior under study. These constructs are discussed in detail below.
Additional constructs
Personal Norm. According to the norm-activation theory (Schwartz, 1968, 1977) personal 
norms are self-expectations based on internalised values. They are feelings of personal 
obligation to perform a certain behavior, and in that way prescribe what one “ought to do”. 







first. Activation occurs when people are aware of the negative consequences of their behav-
ior and feel that they are responsible for these consequences. Also, norms are activated 
when people identify actions that can counter these negative consequences, and feel that 
they can perform these actions (Harland, Staats, & wilke, 2007). This activation results in a 
feeling of having to perform a certain behavior.
Several studies have shown that personal norms can significantly predict behavioral 
intention. Harland, Staats and wilke (1999) studied environmentally relevant behavior in a 
household setting. They found that personal norms significantly explained intentions and 
behaviors such as using unbleached paper and using energy-saving light bulbs after the 
TPb constructs were accounted for. Moan and Rise (2005) examined if an extended version 
of the TPb could predict intentions to stop smoking and the subsequent behavior 6 months 
later. They found that personal norms predicted both intentions to stop smoking and actual 
quitting behavior. bamberg, Hunecke and blöbaum (2007) reported two studies in which 
they found that personal norm was a significant predictor of intention to use public trans-
port and this effect was independent of attitude and perceived behavioral control.
Self-identity. The construct of self-identity stems from identity theory, which describes the 
self as a collection of identities derived from the various social roles someone occupies 
(Stryker, 1968). Although all these role identities have the potential to influence behavior, it 
depends on their relative salience which of these identities will have the strongest influence 
on behavior. Some roles are more salient than others: These roles have more self-relevance 
than other roles and they are more likely to be invoked in different situations (Hogg, Terry & 
white, 1995). Used in combination with the TPb, self-identity refers to the extent to which a 
certain behavior is seen as part of the self. Research shows that self-identity is an impor-
tant predictor of behavioral intentions (see Armitage & Conner, 1999). Sparks and Sheperd 
(1992) found that self-identity explained intentions to consume organically grown food, even 
when accounting for the TPb constructs and past behavior. In a subsequent study, Sparks 
and Guthrie (1998) found that self-identity explained intentions to adopt a more healthy diet. 
This effect was independent of personal norm and the TPb constructs. Fielding et al. (2008) 
showed that self-identity was an independent predictor of the intention to engage in envi-
ronmental activism.
In sum, both personal norm and self-identity have proven to be successful in predicting 
a wide range of behaviors. In the current study, we want to expand the previous research by 
applying this knowledge to a new population and a new set of behaviors: farmers and their 
nature conservation practices. In contrast to Fielding et al. (2005), who focused on ripar-
ian zone management specifically, we will focus on general nature conservation practices. 
Also, while the work of Fielding et al. studied only non-subsidized practices, we are inter-
ested in determining the differences in subsidized versus non-subsidized practices. Finally, 
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the work of Fielding et al. did not include the concept of self-identity: A concept that plays a 
central role in the current study.
The current study: aims and hypotheses
based on the above, our first aim was to investigate the social-psychological underpinnings 
of nature conservation practices using the TPb, including self-identity and personal norm. 
Moreover, we were interested in the possible differences in subsidized and non-subsidized 
practices. The second aim of this study therefore is to investigate whether different proc-
esses underlie these two types of nature conservation practices.
we believe that farmers will be more extrinsically motivated to perform subsidized 
nature conservation practices, and more intrinsically motivated to perform non-subsidized 
nature conservation practices. Associated with intrinsic motivation are feelings of personal 
obligation to perform nature conservation practices and seeing these practices as some-
thing that is part of the self. Thus, we believe that feelings of self-identity and personal norm 
will be associated more with non-subsidized then with subsidized practices.
More specifically, we hypothesize that: The TPb constructs will significantly predict both 
the intention to perform non-subsidized nature conservation practices as well as the inten-
tion to perform subsidized nature conservation practices (Hypothesis 1) and that self-identity 
and personal norm will be more associated with the intention to perform non-subsidized 
nature conservation practices than subsidized nature conservation practices (Hypothesis 2). 
Furthermore, we were interested in the relation between our psychological model and self-
reported behavior: we therefore included a measure on time spent on nature conserva-
tion practices, and we predict that the intention to perform both non-subsidized as well as 




Eight Dutch farmers were interviewed before making a first version of the questionnaire. 
This was done to ensure that all constructs in the questionnaire would be relevant and 
understandable for participants. based on these interviews, a first version of the question-
naire was constructed and tested on four different farmers to ensure that the phrasing of 
the questions in the questionnaire was comprehensible and acceptable for participants. The 








Our sample consisted of 109 arable farmers from Zeeland, a province in the southwest of 
the Netherlands. These farmers were recruited through their local agricultural organiza-
tions. These agricultural organizations generally have three goals: to increase the ecologi-
cal values of farms, to jointly apply for conservation subsidies, and to increase the general 
publics’ goodwill towards farmers. we specifically chose to select farmers through agricul-
tural organizations for a reason: these organizations are rapidly growing and their members 
already make up 10 % of all the farmers in the Netherlands, while the amount of farmland 
owned by their members is 50 % of the total Dutch farmland (Oerlemans, Guldemond, & 
Visser, 2007). Since this group of farmers is becoming more and more important it makes 
sense to focus on them specifically.
 Participants were initially contacted by telephone. After having agreed on participating, 
they received the questionnaire at home, together with a return envelope. In total, 85 farm-
ers (94.1 % male, mean age 46.9 years) filled out and returned the questionnaire, making 
the response rate 78 %.
Questionnaire
All questionnaire items were measured on 5-point scales. because we were interested in 
the possible differences between non-subsidized and subsidized nature conservation prac-
tices, all items were measured for both types of practices.
Attitude was measured using the items “I think that subsidized/ non-subsidized nature 
conservation practices are: negative-positive”, “I think that subsidized/ non-subsidized 
nature conservation practices are: useless – useful”, and “I think that subsidized/ non-
subsidized nature conservation practices are: unimportant– important” (Azjen & Fishbein, 
1980). This scale yielded a sufficiently high reliability for both subsidized (α= .77) and non-
subsidized practices (α= .87).
Perceived behavioral Control was measured using the item “I am capable of carrying 
out subsidized/ non-subsidized nature conservation practices: completely disagree – com-
pletely agree” (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980).
Subjective Norm was measured using the item “Most people that are important for me 
think it is important that I carry out subsidized/ non-subsidized nature conservation prac-
tices: completely disagree – completely agree” (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980).
To measure Personal Norm, we used 2 items, both on a scale ranging from completely 
disagree to completely agree (Vining & Ebreo, 1992): “I feel a strong personal obligation 
to carry out subsidized/ non-subsidized nature conservation practices” and “I would feel 
guilty if I would not carry out subsidized/ non-subsidized nature conservation practices”. 
 A Social-Cognitive Explanation Of Motivational Differences  23
Cronbach’s α for this scale is 0.77 for subsidized nature conservation practices and 0.85 for 
non-subsidized nature conservation practices.
Self-identity was measured with 2 items, both on a scale ranging from completely disa-
gree to completely agree (Terry, Hogg & white, 1999): “Subsidized/ non-subsidized nature 
conservation practices are part of who I am” and “Subsidized/ non-subsidized nature con-
servation practices are something for that is typical for me”. Cronbach’s α for this scale is 
0.80 for subsidized nature conservation practices and 0.90 for non-subsidized nature con-
servation practices.
Intention was measured using 2 items (Perugini & bagozzi, 2001), being: “In the future, 
under the same conditions I would perform these nature conservation practices again” 
and “Given the opportunity I would perform these nature conservation practices again”: 
 certainly not – certainly”. Cronbach’s α for this scale is 0.84 for the intention to perform sub-
sidized nature conservation practices and 0.90 for the intention to perform non-subsidized 
nature conservation practices.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for both subsidized and non-subsidized 
practices are listed in Table 2.1. Inspection of this table shows that the mean scores on 
scales used in our model were above the scale means, and that the intention to perform 
subsidized practices was positively correlated with the intention to perform non-subsidized 
practices.
Subsidized practices
A regression analysis was performed with intention as the dependent variable and atti-
tude, perceived behavioral control, subjective norm, self-identity and personal norm as the 
independent variables. In the first step, the TPb-concepts attitude, perceived behavioral 
control and subjective norm were entered into the equation. Only attitude was found to be a 
significant predictor of intention (β = 0.31, p < .01). The proportion of the variance in intention 








Table 2.1 Means, Standard deviations, and Correlations






3.24 1.10 .28* 1
3. Subsidized PBC 4.43 0.72 .06 .26* 1
4. Subsidized 
Intention
3.78 0.70 .36** .27* .19 1
5. Subsidized 
Personal Norm
2.98 1.10 .39** .36** .12 .16 1
6. Subsidized 
 Self-identity
3.34 0.98 .25** .42** .18 .24* .49** 1
7. Non-subsidized 
Attitude
3.78 0.78 -.03 -.16 -.14 .21 .00 .08 1
8. Non-subsidized 
Subjective Norm
2.79 1.12 .11 .25* -.04 .40** .14 .26* .44** 1
9. Non-subsidized 
PBC
3.83 1.10 -.14 -.16 .08 .04 -.21 -.02 .55** .27* 1
10. Non-subsidized 
Intention
2.70 1.03 .02 .03 .03 .35** -.02 .20 .64** .51** .49** 1
11. Non-subsidized 
Personal Norm
2.54 1.05 .10 -.12 -.14 .19 .27 .18 .48** .32** .26* .40** 1
12. Non-subsidized 
Self-identity
3.00 1.05 -.07 -.25* -.08 .11 .00 .18 .56** .33** .49** .60** .70** 1
13. Time spent on 
subsidized practices
35.44 38.46 -.20 -.07 -.03 .26* .19 .23* .28* .25* -.07 .25* .26* .22 1
14. Time spent on 
non-subsidized 
practices
96.42 206.76 .09 -.11 -.07 -.01 .08 .01 .21 .08 .02 -.08 .16 .14 .20 1
* p <.05.
** p < .01
In the second step, personal norm and self-identity were added to the analyses. In Table 2.2 
it can be seen that neither of these concepts were significant predictors of intention, and 
that attitude remained the sole significant predictor. Adding personal norm and self-identity 
improved the proportion explained variance by 1.2 % and this step was not significant.
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Table 2.2 Subsidized nature conservation practices. Regression analysis with intention as the dependent variable 














* p < .05
** p < .01
Non-subsidized practices
As with subsidized nature conservation practices, a regression analysis was performed 
with intention as the dependent variable and attitude, perceived behavioral control, subjec-
tive norm, self-identity and personal norm as the independent variables. In the first step, 
the TPb-concepts attitude, perceived behavioral control and subjective norm were entered 
into the equation. both attitude (β = 0.52, p < .01), subjective norm (β = 0.27, p < .05) and per-
ceived behavioral control (β = 0.20, p < .05) were effective in predicting intention, see Table 
2.3. The proportion of the variance in intention to perform non-subsidized nature conserva-
tion practices explained by the TPb concepts was 47.1 %.
In the second step, personal norm and self-identity were added to the analyses. Attitude 
and subjective norm remained significant predictors although their betas slightly decreased. 
Perceived behavioral control no longer had a significant effect on intention. Self-identity 
(β = 0.36, p < .01) had a significant effect on intention whereas personal norm did not. Adding 
personal norm and self-identity improved the proportion explained variance by 6.2 % and 
this step was significant, p < .01
Table 2.3  Non-subsidized nature conservation practices. Regression analysis with intention as the dependent variable 






















Self-reported intentions and time spent on nature conservation practices
we were also interested in testing whether self-reported intentions to engage in nature 
conservation practices were significant predictors of how much time was spent on these 
practices. As a self-reported measure of spent time we asked participants how much time 
they spent on either non-subsidized or subsidized nature conservation practices per season, 
and then aggregated these scores over the year. On average, participants spent 35.44 hours 
per year on subsidized practices (Sd = 38.46) and 96.42 hours on non-subsidized practices 
(Sd = 206.76). we then regressed the amount of time spent on nature conservation practices 
on intention and found that this effect was significant for subsidized practices (β = 0.26, p < 
.05) but not for non-subsidized practices (β= -0.8, n.s.).
Summary and conclusion
we tested a model based on the Theory of Planned behavior, to which personal norm and 
self-identity were added. This model was tested twice: Once for subsidized and once for 
non-subsidized practices. we hypothesized that the TPb would predict both non-subsidized 
and subsidized practices; and that personal norm and self-identity would better predict 
non-subsidized than subsidized practices.
The first hypothesis was supported: The intention to perform subsidized practices was 
predicted by attitude, while the intention to perform non-subsidized practices was pre-
dicted by both attitude and subjective norm. Perceived behavioral control had no effect on 
the intention to perform nature conservation practices.
Our second hypothesis was also partly supported. Contrary to our expectations, per-
sonal norm did not significantly predict intention to perform non-subsidized practices. Self-
identity, however, did have a significant positive impact on intention.
Furthermore we saw that self-reported intentions to perform nature conservation prac-
tices were significant predictors for self-reported time spent on subsidized practices but 
not on non-subsidized practices. Finally, our model explained 19 % of the variance in inten-
tion to perform subsidized practices, versus 56 % of the variance in intention to perform 
non-subsidized practices.
General Discussion
Stimulating biodiversity is an issue that is high on the political agenda. More than individual 
consumers, farmers’ behaviors have a direct impact on nature and biodiversity. Therefore 
it is generally acknowledged that we need a better understanding of farmers’ decision-
making processes concerning conservation nature conservation practices (burton, 2004). 
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In the analysis presented here, a major finding was that these processes differ between 
subsidized and non-subsidized practices
A first distinction between subsidized and non-subsidized practices is the role played by 
self-identity. As we have seen self-identity significantly predicts intention to perform non-
subsidized but not subsidized nature conservation practices. How can this difference be 
explained? we have mentioned before that self-identity is associated with intrinsic motiva-
tion. This relation can be explained in greater detail when we look at self-perception theory 
(bem, 1972). This theory holds that people construe their self-image on the basis of their 
actions instead of the other way around. People who believe they are free to choose to per-
form a certain behavior attribute the performance of this behavior to their self-concept. As 
Cialdini (2001, p. 82) said: “we accept inner responsibility for a behavior when we think we 
have chosen to perform it in the absence of strong outside pressure”. we believe a similar 
process explains our finding that self-identity is related to the intention to perform non-
subsidized but not subsidized nature conservation practices. Farmers engage in these 
practices while not being rewarded for them. This leads them to reason that they must be 
“the kind of people who do these things “and that these nature conservation practices are 
part of who they are.
A second difference between subsidized and non-subsidized practices is the relation 
between self-reported intention and self-reported time spent on these practices. As we 
have seen this relation is significant for subsidized but not for non-subsidized practices. we 
believe this (lack of) effect mirrors the difference in perspectives on both types of nature 
management. Since subsidized management is basically a business agreement between a 
farmer and the government, it comes with an “economic rationalist” perspective. within 
this perspective it is important to keep track of how many hours are spent on nature con-
servation practices in order to see whether the remuneration is sufficient. Non-subsidized 
practices, however, are usually not fully incorporated into the farm management and are 
often carried out in between other tasks. It is therefore difficult to keep track of the hours 
spent on these practices, which may cause for the lack of a significant relation between 
intention and behavior in this study. It is important to note that the average amount of time 
spent on non-subsidized practices exceeded the average amount of time spent on subsi-
dized practices.
An unexpected finding in this study was that personal norm had no significant effect on 
intention to perform nature conservation practices. This is surprising since other research 
shows that personal norms play an important role in environmental behavior (bamberg & 
Möser, 2007; Harland et al., 1999). The question thus arises why this is not the case in this 
study. Inspection of the mean scores on all of our model’s constructs learns that partici-
pants scored the lowest on personal norm, indicating that this construct was less relevant 
to them than the other constructs measured in the current study. Combining this finding 







concluded that the behavior investigated in the current study does not seem to carry moral 
implications. That is, farmers do not engage in these practices because they feel a moral 
obligation to do so, but rather as a result of a positive attitude towards the behavior and the 
perception that these practices fit their identity as conservationists.
The goal of this study was to investigate farmers’ motivation to engage in nature conser-
vation practices and to find out whether there are fundamental differences in motivation for 
subsidized and non-subsidized practices. Our results clearly show that there are. we hope 
this study contributes to a better understanding of why farmers choose to engage in nature 
conservation practices.
Ideally this better understanding aids in the improvement of policy instruments aimed at 
agricultural nature conservation. Our conclusion is not that the current policy of subsidies 
is not effective. However, we do see that farmers engage in nature conservation practices 
aside from these subsidies and that their motivation for these non-subsidized subsidies is 
to an important degree based on their self-identity: They see themselves as conservation-
oriented farmers. These two types of motivations, reward-based and identity-based, are 
mutually co-existent. Our results corroborate the findings of wilson and Hart (2004) that 
farmers’ decision-making processes are more and more influenced by conservation-ori-
ented motivations and that these are not incompatible with financial considerations. This 
point is highlighted by our finding that intention to perform non-subsidized practices corre-
lates significantly with intention to perform subsidized practices. Thus, in this study we have 
found no evidence for the crowding out effect (Frey, 1997). we believe the current challenge 
for policymakers is to find ways to address farmers’ self-identity as conservationists and in 
that way improve nature conservation.
Chapter 3  
 
Using Tailored Information and Public 
Commitment to Improve the Environmental 
Quality of Farm Lands1
1 This chapter is based on Lokhorst, Van Dijk, Staats, Van Dijk, & De Snoo (2009b) and is therefore written in the 
first-person plural.
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Scientists, policy makers and the general public agree that action must be undertaken 
to stop the rapid degradation of our natural environment. while technical solutions and 
environmental policies are promising, they can only be successful when accompanied by 
changes in human behavior (Stern & Oskamp, 1987). Unfortunately, changing human behav-
ior is not an easy task. A vast amount of research has focused on changing people’s environ-
mental attitudes and behaviors and has yielded mixed results (for reviews, see Abrahamse 
et al., 2005; De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993). while these studies typically focus on 
household behaviors such as recycling (e.g. DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995, Harland et al., 1999) 
and energy conservation (Pallak & Cummings, 1976; Katzev & Johnson, 1983), Gardner and 
Stern (2002) argue that research should target those behaviors that have the largest impact 
on our environment.
One approach is to distinguish environmental behaviors such as using energy-efficient 
lamps and lowering the thermostat in terms of their effect on the environment, and then 
target the behaviors that affect the environment the most. A complementary approach 
would be to distinguish between groups of people in these terms. Some people might have 
a stronger influence on the environment based on their societal or job position. If this is the 
case, then it makes sense to target these people and their environmental behaviors specifi-
cally.
Following this line of reasoning, in the current study we therefore focus on farmers, 
who have a tremendous influence on the environment due to the large areas of land in 
agricultural use. More specifically, by adopting nature conservation practices, farmers can 
strongly improve the environmental quality of their land. This study focuses on improving 
these conservation practices by developing and testing an intervention, for which we relied 
on the vast body of social psychological research on interventions in the environmental 
domain. A key aspect of the current study is that it combines social psychological measures 
with ecological ones, making it possible to test relations between aspects of motivation and 
outcomes on the level of environmental quality.
Intervention
Attempts to change people’s attitudes and behaviors often rely on the presentation of infor-
mation. One of such informational techniques that has often been used in social psychologi-
cal research is the administration of feedback (see, for instance, Abrahamse et al., 2007; 
Staats et al., 2004). Administering feedback entails providing people with information about 
their current behavior. A distinction is made between feedback on the individual and feed-
back on the group level. The latter is also described as a type of comparative feedback as it 
provides the opportunity to compare one’s behavior with that of others. This way feedback 
can be successful in changing behavior because it possibly makes salient a social norm in 







the provision of tailored information: information that is tailored specifically to a person’s 
individual needs. This technique has been used for example to give garage managers advice 
on how to reduce oil pollution of wastewater in a study done by Daamen, Staats, wilke, 
and Engelen (2001) and was found effective. An important aspect of this study is that it 
targeted professionals instead of the more usual and more general sample of consumers. 
The current study focuses on farmers, who are professionals as well; therefore, the work 
by Daamen et al. served as an important impetus for the current study to include tailored 
advices.
An important distinction between feedback and tailored advice giving is that feedback 
is a so-called consequent strategy (informing participants about the consequences of their 
behavior) where as tailored advice giving is an antecedent strategy (informing participants 
on how to alter their future behavior effectively; see Dwyer et al., 1993). In the current inter-
vention we used both techniques in order to increase the effectiveness of the information 
provided.
The effects of feedback techniques are often limited to shorter periods of time (Staats 
et al., 2000). Also, it is assumed that interventions are more successful when they are mul-
tifaceted and consist of multiple strategies (Gardner & Stern, 2002; werner et al., 1995). 
Therefore in the current research we decided to further enrich our intervention package 
with a technique called public commitment making, in which an individual is asked to make 
a commitment to perform a certain behavior with others present. Commitment making is 
generally seen as a promising intervention technique (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Katzev & 
wang, 1994; De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993) and has been shown to influence for instance 
recycling (DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995; wang & Katzev, 1990) and choosing public transport over 
car use (Matthies et al., 2006). Commitment can influence behavior in several ways (see 
Lokhorst et al., 2008). First, commitment can change people’s self-concept such that the 
new behavior becomes a part of the self. Second, commitments can evoke either a social or 
personal norm to engage in the behavior at stake. Third, making a commitment can set in 
motion a process generally referred to as cognitive elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986): A 
process whereby the individual elaborates on the possible reasons to engage in the behav-
ior and strategies to accurately perform the behavior, resulting in a strong and accessible 
attitude towards the behavior.
The current research: farmers and conservation
In this study we focus on farmers and their conservation practices. These practices consist 
of reducing emissions of agrochemicals and fertilizer to the environment, as well as the 
management and maintenance of semi-natural habitats such as riparian zones, hedges and 
other landscape elements. Farmers’ conservation practices have been officially acknowl-
edged by the EU Common Agricultural policy (CAP) since the early 1990s (European Com-
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mission, Directorate-General for agriculture, 2003). As a result, many countries have set 
up subsidy schemes to promote farmer conservation practices. These schemes stimulate 
farmers to set aside part of their productive area for the creation of semi-natural habitats 
for conservation purposes. In addition, farmers have the possibility to perform conserva-
tion practices on a non-subsidized basis. The natural elements stemming from such prac-
tices are not compensated for by any monetary rewards.
Our intervention, combining both tailored information and public commitment, is aimed 
at improving farmers’ conservation practices and is based on the assumption of voluntary 
behavior change. both subsidized and non-subsidized are voluntary behaviors. Even though 
subsidized conservation is contingent on contracts and thus less flexible, farmers are still 
free to choose for this type of conservation or not. Also, they are free to exert as much 
effort as they choose for this type of conservation, as long as they meet the required stand-
ards. Therefore one could reason that both subsidized and non-subsidized conservation 
may be influenced by our intervention package. However, it could also be that the effect of 
our intervention is stronger in the absence of any monetary rewards. Research has shown 
that rewarding a behavior can cause a decline in intrinsic motivation for this behavior. This 
process is called the crowding out effect (Frey, 1997). Seen from this perspective it could be 
that farmers are more motivated to perform non-subsidized conservation, raising the pos-
sibility that our intervention will be more successful in affecting this type of conservation. 
To test the full effect of our intervention and to be able to compare possible changes in non-
subsidized conservation with changes in subsidized conservation we did include measures 
for both types of conservation.
we expected that especially the combination of tailored information and commitment 
would result in a stronger motivation to perform conservation and more/better conserva-
tion. To test this, we created three experimental conditions: one tailored information plus 
commitment condition, one tailored information only condition, and one control condition. 
This way we could test whether tailored information alone is sufficient to elicit change, or 
whether it should be accompanied by a commitment manipulation. A questionnaire meas-
uring  relevant aspects of both subsidized and non-subsidized conservation was filled out by 
participants before and after this intervention. we expected that the combination of tailored 
information and commitment would have a positive effect on conservation. More specifi-
cally, we hypothesized that this would result in a more positive attitude towards conserva-
tion, a stronger desire to engage in conservation, more time spent on conservation, higher 
quality of conservation, an increase in the surface area of (semi-) natural habitat, and more 
habitat diversity, compared to the tailored information only and control conditions. In addi-
tion, we expected the tailored information only condition to show an increase in the afore 









This study took place in Zeeland, a province in the southwest of the Netherlands. we 
restricted the research to arable farms in the marine clay district to minimize the influ-
ence of differences in soil or landscape. Farmers were recruited through their local agri-
cultural organizations. These agricultural organizations generally have three goals: to 
increase the ecological values of farms, to do so by jointly apply for conservation subsidies, 
and to increase the general publics’ goodwill towards farmers. These organizations are 
rapidly growing: The amount of farmland owned by their members is 50 % of the total Dutch 
farmland (Oerlemans et al., 2007). Since this group of farmers is becoming more and more 
important we chose to focus on them specifically.
Participants were initially contacted by telephone. After having agreed on participating, 
they received the baseline questionnaire at home, together with a return envelope. The ini-
tial wave of data collection took place in March 2006. In total, the questionnaire was sent to 
112 farmers, of which 84 farmers (94.1 % male, mean age 46.9 years) filled out and returned 
the questionnaire, making the response rate 78 % (see also Lokhorst et al., 2009a).
During the course of the study, 26 participants dropped out. Total attrition from pretest 
to posttest was 31 %. To examine the nature of attrition, a comparison was made between 
participants who had dropped out and those who remained in the study on average scores 
of time spent on nature conservation, attitude towards nature conservation, farm size, age 
and gender. None of these differences were statistically significant, suggesting that the 
dropout in this study was not selective.
Study design
The final sample of participants who filled out both questionnaires consisted of 58 par-
ticipants (70.2 % male, mean age 49.7 years). we divided our pool of participants into three 
groups: one group received tailored information only, one group received tailored informa-
tion plus a commitment manipulation, and one group served as a control. In the tailored 
information only condition (N = 18), participants were sent feedback reports by mail. Feed-
back reports were tailored around the themes habitat area, habitat diversity and quality of 
management. Especially habitat diversity and adequate habitat management are seen as key 
drivers of biodiversity in agricultural landscapes (benton et al., 2003; blomqvist et al., 2006; 
Duelli, 1997; Manhoudt et al., 2007; weibull et al., 2003). As a source for adequate manage-
ment options, we used a manual for agri-environmental management (Van Paassen, 1998), 
which was published by the Dutch national organization for landscape management and is a 
widely accepted source of advice about agri-environmental management options.
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Feedback reports were tailor made for each farm, based on self reported data on habi-
tat area and management. based on this information, each farm was rated on 4 aspects of 
agri-environmental management by a team of ecologists with expertise in this area. These 
aspects were: 1) total area of semi-natural habitat on the farm; 2) habitat diversity; 3) man-
agement quality of semi-natural habitats on the farm; 4) the contribution of the habitats and 
specific measures (e.g. nesting boxes) on the farm to landscape quality and the occurrence 
of specific groups of organisms (e.g. farmland birds, raptors, amphibians, etc.). Partici-
pants’ performance on each of these aspects was compared with the performance of oth-
ers in their area. we created feedback reports in which this information was presented in 
a clear and understandable way. The feedback was combined with tailored advices on how 
to improve their score in each of the 4 aspects of nature conservation (see also De Snoo, 
2006).
In the information plus commitment condition (N = 16), participants were invited to a 
meeting. we organized two of such meetings: One for each agricultural organization in the 
information plus commitment condition. So, all participants in this condition went to one 
meeting, together with their fellow agricultural organization members. During these meet-
ings, the reports, similar to those in the information only condition, were handed out. Par-
ticipants were given the opportunity to read their reports and discuss the contents among 
themselves. At the end of each meeting we asked participants to publicly state which of the 
advices given in the report they were going to follow up on. This way, a public commitment 
manipulation was administered. In order to enhance the manipulation, minutes of the meet-
ing, including every participant’s commitments, were sent to all participants in this condi-
tion. Of the 17 participants in the information plus commitment condition, 12 were able to 
attend the meetings. All the participants present at the meeting made a commitment. Par-
ticipants who did not attend the study groups and thus received no treatment were excluded 
from further analysis.
The control condition (N = 24) received no treatment. A year later, in March 2007, all 
participants were sent the post-intervention questionnaire.
Questionnaire
All questionnaire items were measured on 5-point scales. because we were interested in 
the possible differences between non-subsidized and subsidized conservation, all items 
were consequently phrased for both types of practices. All items were measured before 
and after the intervention.
Self-report measures. Attitude was measured using the items “I think that subsidized/ non-
subsidized nature conservation practices are: negative-positive”, “I think that subsidized/ 







sidized/ non-subsidized nature conservation practices are: unimportant– important” (Azjen 
& Fishbein, 1980). This scale yielded a sufficiently high reliability for both subsidized (α= .77) 
and non-subsidized practices (α= .87) in the pre-test as well as in the post-test (subsidized 
α= .76, non-subsidized α= .91). The behavioral desire to perform nature conservation was 
measured with the item “I want to perform subsidized/non-subsidized nature conserva-
tion practices”. According to the Model of Goal-Directed behavior, desires “represent the 
motivational state of mind wherein appraisals and reasons to act are transformed into a 
motivation to do so” (Perugini & bagozzi, 2001, p. 84). Therefore, they can be seen as a 
determinant of behavior. For the current study we were particularly interested in using this 
variable as it reflects an individual’s motivation to perform a given behavior irrespective of 
possible practical barriers. Nature conservation is characterized by plenty of practical bar-
riers such as subsidies, changing regulations and income. Using this measure provided us 
with the opportunity to measure the effect of our intervention at the personal motivation to 
perform conservation.
Surface area of (semi-) natural habitat was calculated from self reported data on spe-
cific semi-natural habitats present on the farm. Also, we asked participants if they were 
interested in expanding their current surface area of subsidized (semi-)natural habitat.
Finally, we asked participants how much time they had spent on both subsidized and 
non-subsidized nature conservation practices per season in the past year. we then aggre-
gated these season scores to measures indicating how much time they had spent on both 
subsidized and non-subsidized conservation practices per year.
Ecological measures. Conservation quality was assessed by asking questions regarding the 
use of fertilizer and pesticides, mowing/cutting/vegetation removal regime and timing of 
conservation in relation to breeding and overwintering periods of fauna and seeding peri-
ods of flora. These were aggregated into the following 4 categories to enable comparison 
between differently managed habitats (Van Dijk et al., 2009): 1) protection of the habitat from 
regular farm practice (e.g. actively avoiding fertilizer or pesticide misplacement); 2) war-
ranting spatial and/or temporal continuity of the habitat (e.g. phased mowing or replanting 
trees); 3) actively influencing vegetation structure (e.g. selective cutting of trees, removal 
of exuberant water plant growth); 4) active nutrient reduction (e.g. haymaking). If a farmer 
performed one or more management options within a specific category, one point for man-
agement quality was awarded. In total, a management quality score between 0 (no benefi-
cial management) and 4 (high management quality) could be calculated for each habitat. 
Overall agri-environmental management quality was defined as the average of the manage-
ment scores of all semi-natural habitats present at the farm.
Another ecological measure used was the diversity of habitats. A habitat is commonly 
defined as “a place where an organism or a biological population normally lives or occurs” 
(http://www.biology-online.org). Habitat diversity was defined as the total number of dif-
 Using Tailored Information and Public Commitment 37
ferent habitats and was calculated from the self reported data by adding the number of 
habitats reported to be present on the farm.
Results
All means and standard deviations are listed in Table 3.1. we will first discuss self-report 
measures, after which we will turn to effects found on the ecological measures.
One important feature of the current study is that it involves a collaboration of social psy-
chological and ecological scientists. Using ecological measures implies selecting a sample 
that is not affected by differences in soil or landscape. because of these stringent criteria, 
our final sample was relatively small. Since this study is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first to test the effects of a social psychological intervention on nature conservation 
practiced by farmers, it is exploratory in nature. Therefore, we believe the need to reveal 
possible effects to be greater than the risk of false positive decisions (Myers, 1972; see also 
Hartig et al., 1991). we will thus also report effects at the p < .10 level.
Self-report measures
Attitude. A repeated measures analysis of variance on attitude towards conservation was 
performed. Subsidy (subsidized versus non-subsidized) and time (before and after the inter-
vention) were used as the within subjects factors and experimental condition as the between 
subjects factor. This analysis showed a significant main effect of subsidy, F(1, 40) = 4.56, 
p = .04). Attitude towards subsidized conservation was more positive (M = 4.02) than attitude 
towards non-subsidized conservation (M = 3.81). There were no effects of our intervention.
Behavioral desire to perform nature conservation. Repeated measures analysis of variance on 
behavioral desire to perform conservation with time and subsidy as the within subjects fac-
tors and experimental condition as the between subjects factor showed a significant main 
effect of subsidy, F(1, 46) = 54.77, p = .00). The desire to perform subsidized conservation was 
stronger (M = 4.00) than the desire to perform non-subsidized conservation (M = 2.80). This 
analysis also showed a significant interaction effect of time*experimental condition, F(2,46) 
= 3.491, p = .04. The average score of behavioral desire did not change significantly in the 
control condition (from M = 3.43 to M = 3.16, p = .16) nor in the tailored information only condi-
tion (from M = 3.34 to M = 3.38, p =. 79). It did, however, increase significantly in the tailored 
information plus commitment condition (from M = 3.32 to M = 3.77, p =. 05, one-sided). These 
results are in line with our hypothesis that especially the combination of tailored informa-







Surface area of (semi-)natural habitat. A repeated measures analysis of variance on the sur-
face area of natural habitat with time and subsidy as the within subjects factors and experi-
mental condition as the between subjects factor was performed. This analysis showed a 
significant main effect of subsidy, F(1, 39) = 28.15, p = .00). Our participants had more sub-
sidized (M = 2.60 hectare) than non-subsidized (M = .64 hectare) surface area of natural 
habitat. This analysis also showed a significant main effect of time F(1, 39) = 7.88, p = .01, 
showing that that the surface area of natural habitat increased across all conditions (from 
M = 1.47 hectare to M = 1.77 hectare).
The three-way interaction of time*subsidy*condition was not significant overall, 
F(2,39) = 1.99, p = .15. However, given our specific hypothesis that especially the combina-
tion of tailored information and commitment would affect surface area of natural habitat, 
we looked at subsidized and non-subsidized conservation separately. A repeated measures 
analysis of variance on the surface area of subsidized natural habitat with time as the within 
subjects factor and experimental condition as the between subjects factor showed no sig-
nificant interaction of time*experimental condition, F(2,42) = 0.95, ns. However, a similar 
analysis on the surface area of non-subsidized natural habitat did show an interaction of 
time*experimental condition, F(2,48) = 2.89, p = .07. Repeated measures analysis per condi-
tion showed that the largest change occurred in the tailored information plus commitment 
condition, where participants increased their surface area of non-subsidized natural habi-
tat from 0.47 to 0.90 hectare, p = .06, one-sided. This confirms our hypothesis that espe-
cially the combination of tailored information and public commitment would be successful 
in increasing conservation.
we also asked participants if they were interested in expanding their current surface 
area of subsidized (semi-) natural habitat. A repeated measures analysis of variance with 
time as the within subjects factor and experimental condition as the between subjects fac-
tor was performed. Results showed a significant main effect of time, F(1,49) = 8.15, p = .01. 
The wish to expand decreased across all conditions. we expected this decrease to be caused 
by participants who had already expanded their surface area of subsidized natural habitat. 
Therefore, we calculated the difference scores of surface area of subsidized natural habitat 
by subtracting the surface area of subsidized natural habitat in 2006 from the surface area of 
subsidized natural habitat in 2007. we then included this difference score in the analysis as a 
covariate and indeed the effect of time disappeared F(1,40) = 2.26, n.s. This suggests that our 
finding that the wish to expand decreased across all conditions was explained by the fact that 
farmers had meanwhile expanded their surface area of subsidized natural habitat.
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M SD M SD M SD
Attitude subsidized Pretest  3.98 .10 4.19 .11 3.96 .15
Posttest  4.00 .12 3.98 .12 4.07 .17
Attitude unsubsidized Pretest  3.81 .17 3.84 .18 3.91 .22
Posttest  3.70 .19 3.73 .20 4.03 .25
Desire subsidized Pretest  3.91 .20 4.24 .23 3.73 .28
Posttest  3.86 .18 4.19 .20 4.27 .25
Desire unsubsidized Pretest  3.00 .22 2.53 .26 2.91 .32
Posttest  2.57 .25 2.77 .29 3.27 .36
Time spent subsidized (hours) Pretest  34.90 8.49 37.33 8.95 27.65 12.01
Posttest  34.40 6.83 37.44 7.20 38.40 9.66
Time spent unsubsidized (hours) Pretest  113.33 22.45 58.33 26.56 22.30 32.53
Posttest  48.52 12.02 37.93 14.22 73.25 17.42
Wish to expand Pretest  3.86 .21 3.72 .23 3.36 .30
Posttest  3.46 .22 3.17 .25 3.27 .31
Surface area subsidized (ha) Pretest  2.51 .50 2.21 .54 2.29 .79
Posttest  2.71 .54 2.88 .58 2.47 .85
Surface area not subsidized (ha) Pretest  .59 .17 .71 .19 .47 .24
Posttest  .69 .18 .81 .20 .90 .25
Quality subsidized conservation Pretest  1.71 .21 2.01 .23 1.89 .30
Posttest  1.85 .19 2.29 .21 2.51 .27
Quality unsubsidized conservation Pretest  1.97 .25 1.96 .27 2.20 .39
Posttest  2.04 .26 1.94 .28 2.24 .41
Habitat diversity subsidized Pretest  1.52 .27 2.41 .29 3.18 .41
Posttest  1.64 .35 2.86 .37 3.36 .53
Habitat diversity not subsidized Pretest  4.20 .54 4.32 .58 3.55 .82
Posttest  5.08 .59 5.53 .63 4.73 .89
Time spent on conservation. A repeated measures analysis of variance on time spent on con-
servation with time and subsidy as the within subjects factors and experimental condition 
as the between subjects factor showed a significant main effect of subsidy, F(1, 42) = 7.49, 
p = .01). Participants reported to have spent less time on subsidized (M = 34.64 hours) than 
on non-subsidized conservation (M = 55.26 hours). This analysis also showed a significant 
interaction of time*experimental condition, F(2,42) = 4.22, p = .02. The amount of time spent 
on conservation decreased in the control condition (from M = 67.95 to M = 34.83, p = .02) as 
well as in the tailored information only condition (from M = 49.37 to M = 36.77, p = .27). It did, 
however, increase in the tailored information plus commitment condition (from M = 24.98 to 
M = 55.83, p = .10, one-sided). This analysis also showed a significant three-way interaction 
of time*subsidy*experimental condition, F(2,42) = 4.97, p = .01. To explore the nature of this 
interaction we looked at subsidized and non-subsidized conservation separately. A repeated 







subjects factor and experimental condition as the between subjects factor showed no sig-
nificant interaction of time*experimental condition, F(2,45) = 0.57, p = .57. However, a simi-
lar analysis on time spent on non-subsidized practices did show a significant interaction 
of time*experimental condition, F(2,46) = 4.56, p = .02. Repeated measures analysis per 
condition showed that the time spent on non-subsidized practices decreased in the control 
condition from M = 111.59 to M = 46.32 (p = .01). The time spent on non-subsidized practices 
in the tailored information only condition decreased as well (from M = 58.33 to M = 37.93, p = 
.33). It did, however, increase in the tailored information plus commitment condition (from 
M = 22.30 to M = 73.25, p =. 06, one-sided). This analysis shows that during the course of our 
intervention, participants in the tailored information plus commitment condition had spend 
more time on conservation, and that this was especially true for non-subsidized conserva-
tion. because of the large differences in time spent on conservation between conditions 
before our intervention, these results must be interpreted with caution. However, they are 
in line with our hypotheses.
Ecological measures
Conservation quality. Next, we looked at the quality of conservation. A repeated measures 
analysis of variance on quality of conservation practices and time and subsidy as the within 
subjects factors and experimental condition as the between subjects factor showed a signif-
icant main effect of time, F(1,35) = 5.56, p = .03. Quality of conservation practices increased 
across all conditions, from M = 2.04 to M = 2.20. The interaction of time*subsidy was also 
significant F(1,35) = 3.29, p = .04, one-sided. This means that the quality of subsidized con-
servation practices increased over time (M = 1.89 to M = 2.22, p = .00) whereas the quality of 
non-subsidized conservation practices did not. In other words, the main effect of time was 
qualified by the interaction effect of time*subsidy. This increase in quality of conservation 
was not due to our intervention.
Habitat diversity. we also looked at the diversity of habitats per farm. A repeated meas-
ures analysis of variance with habitat diversity before and after the intervention and subsidy 
as the within subjects factors and experimental condition as the between subjects factor 
showed a significant main effect of subsidy, F(1,56) = 20.87, p = .00. Habitat diversity was 
lower (M = 2.58) for subsidized conservation than for non-subsidized conservation (M = 4.54). 
This means that non-subsidized (semi-) natural habitat was more diverse than subsidized 
(semi-) natural habitat. The analysis also showed a significant main effect of time, F(1,56) 
= 56.08, p = .00. Habitat diversity increased across all conditions, from M = 3.24 to M = 3.88. 
The interaction of time*subsidy was also significant F(1,56) = 25.52, p = .00: non-subsidized 
habitat diversity increased stronger (M = 4.02 to M = 5.05, p = .00) over time than subsidized 
habitat diversity (M = 2.45 to M = 2.70, p = .00). Non-subsidized habitat diversity was not only 
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higher to begin with, but it also increased more than subsidized diversity during the course 
of our intervention. Since there were no significant differences between experimental con-
ditions, this increase cannot be attributed to our intervention.
General Discussion
by adopting conservation practices, farmers can strongly affect environmental quality and 
biodiversity. In this study we have seen that an intervention strategy containing tailored 
information and commitment making can improve these conservation practices. we distin-
guished between subsidized and non-subsidized conservation practices. Participants were 
divided into three groups: One group received information only, one group received informa-
tion plus a commitment manipulation, and one group served as a control. Our results show 
that especially the combination of tailored information and the making of commitments 
was effective in eliciting behavior change: participants in this condition showed a stronger 
behavioral desire to engage in conservation, increased their surface area of non-subsidized 
natural habitat, and reported to spend more time on non-subsidized conservation. Partici-
pants in the tailored information only condition also increased their surface area of non-
subsidized natural habitat but did not show any change on our other measures. In addition, 
we found that while our intervention affected both types of conservation, the effects were 
stronger for non-subsidized conservation.
we found some more noteworthy differences between subsidized and non-subsidized 
conservation. Attitude towards subsidized conservation was more positive than attitude 
towards non-subsidized conservation. This difference can be explained in terms of Azjen’s 
(1991) Theory of Planned behavior, according to which the monetary reward for behavior 
increases the positive attitude towards that behavior. The fact that the desire to perform 
subsidized conservation was also stronger than the desire to perform non-subsidized con-
servation should be seen from the same perspective.
Also, we saw that the quality of subsidized conservation increased over time whereas the 
quality of non-subsidized conservation did not. However, non-subsidized conservation was 
characterized by higher habitat diversity than subsidized conservation. These finding are 
hard to explain from the current data. It could be that farmers have more knowledge of sub-
sidized conservation and are therefore better able to improve the quality of this type of con-
servation. As for habitat diversity, it could be that since non-subsidized conservation is not 
contingent on contracts and thus more flexible, it gives farmers a higher extent of freedom in 
choosing how to set up this conservation. This might then result in higher habitat diversity.
we have found effects of our intervention on different aspects of nature conservation. 
with this setup we were able to show that especially the combination of tailored informa-
tion and public commitment increases the desire to perform conservation, time spent on 







The results presented here are particularly impressive when it is taken into account that 
the commitment manipulation used in this study was not a very strong one: Participants 
were only asked to attend one meeting during the course of the intervention. Yet, our com-
mitment manipulation resulted in a stronger desire to engage in nature conservation and 
an increase in the reported time spent on conservation. Participants who had committed to 
conservation showed more change in these aspects of conservation than participants who 
had only been given tailored information. Our commitment manipulation did not affect all 
the dependent measures in our study. Attitude, quality of conservation and habitat diversity 
did not change as a function of our experimental conditions. Apparently our commitment 
manipulation was not successful in eliciting a more favorable attitude. This might be due 
to the fact that participants committed themselves only once: It might be that in order to 
change an attitude, commitments must be made several times. As for quality of conserva-
tion and habitat diversity, these are ecological measures that might very well be too multi-
determined to change within a year.
Another reason why we believe our results to be very promising is that research has 
shown that farmers’ attitudes and involvement concerning biodiversity are very resistant to 
change. In fact, it has been shown in several studies that conservation practices themselves 
do not influence farmers’ attitudes and behavior (burton et al., 2008). Research by Herzon 
and Mikk (2007) showed that 12 years of agri-environmental measures did not increase 
farmers’ understanding of biodiversity, nor how to improve it. Although our intervention was 
not successful in eliciting attitude change, it did prompt farmers to expand their surface 
area of non-subsidized (semi-)natural habitat, and to devote more time to conservation.
It is important to note that our intervention lasted only one year. Considering the often 
complex decision making and the fact that subsidized conservation is contingent on con-
tracts of multiple years, it seems reasonable to assume that had we been able to stretch 
the intervention for a longer period of time, we would have been able to find more and or 
stronger effects.
The current study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to test the effects of a social 
psychological intervention on nature conservation practiced by farmers, and is therefore 
exploratory in nature. Current knowledge about the social psychological underpinnings 
of farmers’ conservation is limited (burton, 2006; Lokhorst et al., 2009a). In fact, we do 
not know of any study involving farmers that has used a quasi-experimental design to test 
causal effects of interventions on conservation. because of this exploratory nature and our 
relatively small sample size, we have chosen to include effects that were significant at the 
p< .10 level. Another issue to consider is that our conditions differed in initial mean scores 
on some variables. These differences are mainly due to measures of non-subsidized con-
servation that are characterized by a high variability (see also Table 1). we hope this first 
attempt at improving farmers’ conservation practices can serve as an impetus for future 
research in this area.
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In conclusion, this research has shown that a relatively straightforward intervention can 
significantly improve agri-cultural nature conservation. The intervention we tested can be 
used by policymakers: The administration of feedback and tailored advices is not hard to 
implement when there is data present to base the feedback on. Commitment making initia-
tives could be implemented by working together with farmers’ local organizations to ensure 
commitments are made within a group of peers. Given the promising effects of the current 
study, such initiatives are likely to positively affect farmers’ conservation practices and with 
that, environmental quality in general.

Chapter 4  
 
Public Commitment Making as a Structural 
Solution in Social Dilemmas1
1 This chapter is based on Lokhorst, Van Dijk, & Staats (2009) and is therefore written in the first-person plural.
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Public commitment making has been used as an intervention strategy to promote environ-
mental friendly behavior in several studies (e.g., DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995; Matthies, Klöckner, 
& Preissner, 2006) and is seen as quite successful (for overviews see De Young, 1993; Dwyer 
et al., 1993). In these studies, participants are usually asked to make a formal and public 
commitment to engage in a particular type of environmental behavior. However, as DeLeon 
and Fuqua note, “an unknown number of the entire community might refuse to make a 
commitment.” (1995, p. 236). In their own study on the effects of public commitment and 
group feedback on curbside recycling, an average of 36 % of the participants in the commit-
ment conditions did not make a commitment. Other studies on recycling behavior (wang & 
Katzev, 1990) and the use of public transport (Matthies et al., 2006) have reported similar 
reluctance to make commitments.
Although studies on the effects of public commitments do acknowledge that some peo-
ple may be unwilling to make public commitments, the willingness to make public commit-
ments has not been addressed as a focal issue. Thus, to our knowledge, no research has yet 
been done that identifies the conditions under which people will be willing to make public 
commitments to change their environmental behavior. This paper aims to answer that ques-
tion by identifying public commitment making as a structural solution to social dilemmas.
A social dilemma situation occurs when the individual and the collective welfare are at 
odds with each other. The course of action that is attractive for the individual leads to an 
undesirable outcome for the group. This type of situation is very common in everyday life. 
Think for example of the various kinds of environmentally responsible behaviors, such as 
recycling. On the individual level, they are often not attractive to perform, because they are 
costly in terms of resources such as time, attention or money. It is often more attractive 
for the individual not to recycle. On the collective level, however, not recycling leads to an 
undesirable outcome: the rapid decline of our environment. In social dilemmas, behavior for 
the sake of the collective is called cooperation, while behavior for the sake of the individual 
is called defection (for overviews, see Komorita & Parks, 1995; weber, Kopelman, & Mes-
sick, 2004).
One specific type of dilemma is the public good dilemma, in which individual group 
members have to decide on whether or not to contribute to a certain public good. Not con-
tributing may lead to the public good not being realized, whereas contributing may lead to 
exploitation when the rest of the group defects (see e.g. Dawes, Van de Kragt, & Orbell, 
1990; Van Dijk & wilke, 1999). Public goods typically are characterized by the property of 
non-exclusion: People cannot be excluded from consuming the public good. The benefits of 
a public good can therefore also be enjoyed by the group members who did not contribute. 
This causes the problem of free-riding: self-interest may lead group members to rely on 
the contributions of others while not contributing themselves. Eventually this may lead to 
underprovision of the public good. Therefore, it is important to investigate how group mem-







There are several environmental issues that closely resemble a public good dilemma 
(Joireman et al., 2001; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998; Van Vugt & Samuel-
son, 1999). Think for instance of a community that decides to adopt an energy saving system 
such as solar panels, but relies on its members to contribute to such a system. If no one 
contributes, the system will not be realized. However, once the system is realized, all mem-
bers will enjoy its benefits, even the ones not contributing. How can people be induced to 
cooperate under such conditions? A key aspect of decision making in environmental issues 
is the balance between self and collective interest. In order to understand such environ-
mental issues, and to intervene in them, it is essential to understand the nature of social 
dilemmas (Gifford & Hine, 1997; Vlek, 2000).
Past research has shown that a period of communication between group members sig-
nificantly increases cooperation (Dawes, 1980; Kerr & Kaufmann-Gilliland, 1994; Kollock, 
1998; Komorita & Parks, 1995). This is explained by the finding that a period of communica-
tion gives group members the opportunity to make commitments to each other to cooperate 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Group members then experience a strong norm to keep 
their commitments (Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 1997). This research strongly sug-
gests that the making of commitments in the group has a positive influence on cooperation. 
The question that remains unanswered, however, is under which conditions people are will-
ing to make such public commitments.
Commitment making as a structural solution
In his structural goal/expectation theory, Yamagishi (1986b) makes the distinction between 
the “first order” and the “second order” public good. The first order public good is the good 
the group members want to realize or maintain. People who are convinced of the importance 
of the original, first-order public good, want to invest in the realization or maintenance of 
the good. However, the other group members will have to invest as well, or the public good 
will not be realized. People who have a low level of general trust in others are not expected 
to rely on spontaneous cooperation: they do not trust their fellow group members to coop-
erate. Therefore, they are more interested in contributing to a second-order public good: 
a structural change to the dilemma situation which will ensure that the personal benefit 
of contributing to the original public good will exceed the personal cost of doing so. Such 
a second-order public good can for instance be a sanctioning system whereby defection is 
punished and thus made less attractive. Yamagishi (1986b) labels contributing to the sec-
ond-order public good instrumental cooperation, as opposed to elementary cooperation, 
which is cooperation in the original, first-order public good.
In the Yamagishi studies, the structural change is a sanctioning system whereby the 
group member that contributes the least, gets sanctioned. Other possible structural 
changes are for instance a reward system or appointing a leader who decides how much 
every group member has to contribute (Messick et al., 1983). For the current purposes, it 
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is important to acknowledge that for the individual, these structural changes come with a 
cost. Most notably, these structural solutions all lead to a loss of personal freedom for the 
members of the group: they are no longer fully in control over how much they will contribute 
to the public good. Although a structural change might be beneficial for the provision of the 
public good, the experienced loss of freedom that accompanies structural change may pro-
duce reactance and induce group members to oppose such structural change (brehm, 1966, 
1972; see also Van Dijk, wilke, & wit, 2003 for an application of this idea to the installment 
of leadership in social dilemmas).
In the current article we suggest that a system of making public commitments pos-
sesses characteristics that resemble those of structural solutions described above. As Van 
Dijk and wilke (1994, 1999) argued, the interdependence structure of public good settings 
fundamentally changes when people are offered the opportunity to make mutual commit-
ments to contribute. In a context of public commitment making it may in fact become more 
attractive for individual group members to publicly commit themselves to contribute than to 
refrain from mutual commitments. This, of course, is one of the main reasons why mutual 
commitment making is so effective (see also Chen, 1996; Chen & Komorita, 1994; Van de 
Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983), because if one does not make such a commitment others 
may not be expected to commit. Given that people generally keep their promises and stick to 
their commitments (Chen, 1996; Chen & Komorita, 1994; Kerr & Kaufmann-Gilliland, 1994), 
situations offering a possibility to make public and mutual commitments can offer a struc-
tural solution to the public good dilemma. This brief description also highlights another 
aspect in which public commitments may mimic other types of structural changes. Similar 
to structural changes such as the installment of sanctioning systems and leadership, public 
commitment making may also lead to a loss of decisional freedom. In particular, people 
may be reluctant to commit themselves to contribute because it reduces their behavioral 
options. In this way public commitment making is similar to other structural solutions to 
social dilemmas, and contributing to it can thus be seen as a type of instrumental coopera-
tion.
The current study
In this paper, we argue that the making of public commitments can be seen as a structural 
change in dilemma situations. Previous research (Van Dijk & wilke, 1994, 1999) did suggest 
that this could be the case but has focused on the implications for contributions. In this 
paper, we approach this idea from a different angle: If commitment making is in fact a struc-
tural solution, then the same processes that determine people’s choice for other structural 
solutions may also determine their willingness to invest in a system of public commitments. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research looked at commitment making this 
way. In the context of environmental issues, we view environmental behaviors as elemen-







elementary cooperation, and thus take the form of instrumental cooperation. Interpreting 
and characterizing public commitment making as a possible structural solution to a social 
dilemma offers a new perspective: It enables us to make use of the theories of structural 
solutions to predict when people will be interested in pubic commitment making.
As noted above, in its prediction of the willingness to support structural change, struc-
tural goal/expectation theory (Yamagishi, 1986b) assigns a crucial role to interpersonal 
trust. According to structural goal/expectation theory, people who have a high level of 
general trust in others (high trusters) will generally have a lower preference for struc-
tural change than people who have a low level of general trust in others (low trusters). Due 
to their lack of general trust, low trusters will be hesitant to cooperate in the first-order 
dilemma, but more willing to do so to provide the structural solution. Low and high trust-
ers are usually distinguished from each other using a median split on a general trust scale 
(Yamagishi, 1986; Yamagishi, Cook, & watabe, 1998). based on these findings, one might 
expect that low trusters are generally more willing to opt for public commitments than high 
trusters. However, public commitment making differs from other structural solutions, such 
as appointing a leader. In this case, the dilemmatic structure of the situation is altered so 
that group members are no longer dependent on one another. This means trust between 
group members is no longer an issue, and that low trusters can cooperate without being 
afraid of exploitation. It is because of this that low trusters are inclined to contribute to a 
structural solution. but with public commitment making, group members are still highly 
dependent one each other. This means that low trusters still run the risk of being exploited 
when they cooperate. Therefore we believe low trusters will not necessarily be interested 
in investing in commitment making.
Although structural goal/expectation theory has paid special attention to the role of 
general trust, it should of course be acknowledged that people’s decisions are not solely 
determined by their dispositions. besides the general expectations that are derived from 
dispositional trust, people can also rely on information they have about the specific situ-
ation they are in. In particular, people may have situation-specific information about what 
to expect from others. One could argue that in this sense situation-specific expectations 
function in a way that is similar to dispositional trust: Like high dispositional trust, high 
situational expectations may lead to a low willingness to make public commitments. As a 
consequence, one might reason that studying situation-specific expectations may not pro-
vide new input to the question of when people are willing or reluctant to make public com-
mitments.
In the current paper, however, we wish to draw special attention to the fact that these 
situational and general expectations can also be incongruent with each other. Imagine 
attending a charity fundraising event at which all guests are asked to make a donation for 
some kind of good cause. In general, you trust people’s intentions and so you expect them to 
contribute. but just as you are about to leave your house to go to the fundraising event, you 
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read on the internet that the previous event raised a rather small amount of money: Just 
enough to cover expenses, but no significant sum for charity. would you feel confident about 
making anonymous contributions? Or would you rather sit down with the other guests and 
make commitments to each other to contribute?
Receiving information that is incongruent with general expectations may induce people 
to choose differently from what they would do based on these general expectations. In gene-
ral, high trusters are likely to trust others to contribute. Their general expectation is that 
others will cooperate, and as such structural goal/expectation theory would predict that 
they would not be interested in contributing to the secondary public good. This would imply 
that they would not contribute to a public commitment system, but would rather rely on ele-
mentary cooperation, because they believe this to be enough to reach their goal. but what if 
they are confronted with a situational expectation that is incongruent, i.e. the message that 
others might not contribute a lot? Such situation-specific information would signal to them 
that the group runs the risk of the public good not being realized. One way to prevent this 
from happening and ensure realization of the public good is to make public commitments. 
Thus, for high trusters, the willingness to support a system of public commitment making 
may be especially high when faced with low situation-specific expectations. Vice versa, high 
trusters who are faced with high situation-specific expectations may believe their goal will 
be reached anyway and may thus not be willing to make an extra effort to ensure this.
In contrast, for low trusters, the willingness to support a system of public commitment 
making may be especially high when faced with high situation-specific expectations. Low 
trusters do not believe their goal of realization of the public good will be reached with ele-
mentary cooperation. when they are confronted with a situational expectation that others 
will contribute a lot, this might signal to them that there is a chance that their goal can be 
reached. Their low level of dispositional trust will prevent them from elementary contribu-
tion, but they might be interested in contributing to a second order public good. Low trusters 
who are faced with low situation-specific expectations, will probably think there is no way 
their goal will be reached and will therefore not contribute to a second order public good.
based on the previous reasoning, we expect an interaction effect of dispositional trust 
and situational expectations on the willingness to install a public commitment system. we 
expect that a) more low trusters will be in favor of a public commitment system under high 
situational expectations than under low situational expectations, and b) more high trusters 
will be in favor of a public commitment system under low situational expectations, than 
under high situational expectations. Two studies were carried out to test this hypothesis.
Study 1
As a first test of our ideas, we conducted a scenario study. The public good in this study was 







neighborhood that was in need of a park. Every neighbor would have to decide whether or 
not to contribute to the realization of this new park. we manipulated situational expecta-
tions by giving our participants bogus information on voluntary contributions made by oth-
ers in a similar situation. These voluntary contributions were either high (24-25 euros) or 
low (1-2 euros). Dispositional trust was assessed using a questionnaire.
Method Study 1
Participants and design
For this study with a 2 (Dispositional trust: low vs. high) by 2 (Situational expectations: low 
vs. high) between-participants design, 78 (18 male, 60 female; mean age = 19.2 years) stu-
dents at Leiden University participated.
Procedure
Assessment of dispositional trust. To distinguish high trusters from low trusters, participants 
were first asked to fill out the six-item dispositional trust scale by Yamagishi and Yamagishi 
(1994). This trust scale was presented as an unrelated study. The scale contains items such 
as “Most people are basically honest”. Each item was scored on a 7 point scale ranging 
from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”. The scale yielded a reliability just underneath the 
traditional threshold (α= .65) and, consistent with Yamagishi, Cook, and watabe (1998), a 
median split was performed (median = 4.67) to separate the low trusters (n = 40) from the 
high trusters (n = 38).
Scenario study. Next, participants were presented with a scenario that captured the main 
aspects of a public good dilemma. The following text was distributed among participants in 
the low situational expectations conditions. Information given in the high situational expec-
tations conditions is put between parentheses.
“The neighborhood you live in is very new. Much needs to be done to improve the environ-
ment. The neighbors have formed a committee aimed at realizing a new park. All neighbors 
will be asked to make a voluntary contribution. You want your neighborhood to get a nice 
park. The more everyone contributes, the nicer the park will be. but all of the neighbors can 
decide for themselves how much to contribute. You will decide for yourself as well and will 
have no idea what the others will do. It could be that the others contribute much less than 
you. while you are contemplating on how much to contribute, someone points out a news 
paper article to you that is about a similar initiative in another neighborhood. The article 
says that people in this neighborhood voluntarily contributed 1-2 (24-25) euros to the reali-
zation of their park.”
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Next, we presented them with a choice: They could either keep the situation as it was, 
and let everyone decide for themselves how much to contribute; or they could invest two 
hours of their time to go to a meeting where they could make a commitment to the rest of 
the group. Participants could indicate their choice by checking one of the boxes. After doing 
so, the experiment was finished. Participants were debriefed and paid €1, 50.
Results Study 1
Manipulation check
To check our manipulation of situational expectations, we asked participants if they thought 
people in this kind of situation contribute a little (1) or a lot (7). A 2 (Dispositional trust) x 
2 (Situational expectations) ANOVA showed only a main effect of situational expectations, 
F(1,74) = 41.92, p < .001. Participants in the high situational expectations condition scored 
higher on this item (M = 4.40, SD = 1.06) than participants in the low situational expectations 
condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.37). These results suggest that our manipulation was success-
ful.
Willingness to commit
In total, 34.6 % of the participants wanted to install a system of public commitments. A log-
linear analysis showed a significant three-way-interaction of Dispositional trust by Expec-
tations by willingness to commit, χ² (1) = 3.77, p = .05.
To break down the interaction effect, separate chi square tests were conducted for both 
low and high trusters. For high trusters, the relationship between situational expectations 
and the willingness to commit was significant, χ² (1) = 3.99, p = .05, showing that under low 
situational expectations, 44.4 % of them wanted to install a system of public commitments, 
versus 15 % under high situational expectations, see Table 4.1.
For low trusters, however, the opposite pattern was found: they were more in favor 
of installing a public commitment system under high (46.7 %) than under low situational 
expectations (36 %), but this effect did not reach significance, χ² (1) = .44, p = .51.
Table 4.1 Willingness to Commit as a Function of Dispositional Trust and Situational Expectations (Experiment 1)
Low situational expectations High situational expectations
Low trust 36 % 46.7 %
High trust 44.4 % 15 %








This study showed an interaction effect of dispositional trust and situational expectations 
on the willingness to install a system of public commitments. It appeared that high trusters 
were more in favor of a system of public commitments under low situational expectations 
than under high situational expectations. we also expected that low trusters would be more 
interested in a system of public commitments when their situational expectations would be 
high rather than low. Although this effect did not reach significance, the direction was as we 
expected: Low trusters were more in favor of installing a public commitment system under 
high than under low situational expectations. Overall, the results of Study 1 are in line with 
our hypothesis.
These findings suggest that people are interested in the installment of a public commit-
ment system when they are confronted with a situational expectation that is incongruent 
with their dispositional expectation. The question that remains unanswered is of course 
why participants chose for the installment of a public commitment system. what motive did 
they have in mind while making their decision? As mentioned before, we reasoned that high 
trusters generally expect that others will cooperate and that this will lead to the provision 
of the public good. when they receive the message that others’ contributions might be low, 
this signals to them that the public good might not be realized. For them, public commit-
ment making serves as a way to ensure the provision of the public good, i.e., to further the 
collective interest.
Low trusters, on the other hand, are less likely to rely on spontaneous cooperation and 
expect others to defect. when they receive the message that others’ contributions might 
be high, this creates a decisional conflict: Should they act in accordance with their general 
expectations and defect, or should they follow their situational expectations and contrib-
ute? As Yamagishi (1986b) states in his structural goal/expectation theory, low trusters will 
contribute to a structural solution of the dilemma when they have developed the goal of 
achieving mutual cooperation. we therefore expected that if low trusters choose for public 
commitment making, they do so to provide the public good, i.e., to further the collective 
interest. This means that, although the conditions under which they choose for a public 
commitment system may differ for low and high trusters, their underlying motive for choos-
ing to invest in a public commitment system may essentially be the same: the motive to 
further the collective interest. we therefore conducted a second study in which we also 
assessed the importance of this underlying motive.
Study 2
This second study was performed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. Also we 
wanted to address a few possible limitations of the first study. First of all, Study 1 was a sce-
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nario study in which participants were asked to imagine the importance of the public good. 
Second, because we used a scenario study, we were able to show effects on the preference 
for a system of public commitments, but not yet on the behavioral level. Third, in Study 1, we 
tried to stress the dilemmatic nature of the situation by telling participants that “it could be 
that the others contribute much less than you.” we wanted to make sure our results were 
not caused by this possible salience of defection. And finally, we tested our predictions in a 
situation where the structural solution was not that costly to install.
To address these limitations we designed a laboratory study in which participants 
could contribute to a valuable public good by making actual choices concerning their own 
money in a situation where the making of public commitments would be costly. because 
we were interested in the underlying motive for choosing a system of public commitments, 
we assessed the importance of the motive of maximizing the collective outcomes. Our first 
hypothesis was the same as in Study 1, but we also hypothesized that the interaction effect 
of dispositional trust and situational expectations on the willingness to install a public com-
mitment system would be mediated by the motive to maximize collective outcomes.
Method Study 2
Participants and design
For this experiment with a 2 (Dispositional trust: low vs. high) by 2 (Situational expectations: 
low vs. high) design, 122 students (30 male and 92 female, mean age 21.2 years) of Leiden 
University participated.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were immediately placed in separate booths. They were 
told that their computers were linked to those of four other participants with whom they 
formed a five person-group.
Assessment of dispositional trust. Participants were first presented with eight items meas-
uring their general level of trust (Yamagishi, 1988). As in the first study, participants were 
told that this questionnaire belonged to a different, unrelated study. They could answer 
the items on a scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). An example of an 
item is “You should not trust other people unless you know them very well”. Higher scores 
indicated lower levels of trust. Combining the items resulted in a reliable scale (α= .76). 
A median split (median = 3.75) was used to divide participants in low (n = 59) and high trust-







Social dilemma. The participants were then told that within their five person-groups, each 
group member had 100 chips and that each chip was worth 5 eurocents. They could either 
keep the chips for themselves or contribute them to a common fund. Chips in this com-
mon fund would be doubled and distributed under all group members. Participants in the 
low situational expectations condition were told that in previous experiments, participants 
generally contributed between 22 and 28 chips to the common fund. In the high situational 
expectations condition, participants were told that participants in previous studies gener-
ally contributed between 72 and 78 chips.
Then, participants were told that a system of public commitments could be installed. This 
would mean that they would first have to make a commitment to the rest of the five person-
group, and then they would see the other group members’ commitments. Installing this pub-
lic commitment system would cost each participant ten chips. Participants were asked if they 
were willing to invest ten of their chips in the installment of a system of public commitments. 
Participants could answer this question with a yes or a no. we then asked participants to 
what extent they agreed with the statement “I wanted maximum outcomes for us as group” 
with regard to their decision to invest in a system of public commitments. Participants could 
select an answer ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). After answering this question, 
the experiment was over. All participants were thoroughly debriefed and paid €6.
Results Study 2
Willingness to commit
In total, 43.4 % of the participants agreed to change to a public commitment system. 
A  loglinear analysis showed a significant three-way-interaction of Dispositional trust x 
 Situational expectations x willingness to commit, χ² (1) = 7.06, p < .05.
To break down the interaction effect, separate chi square tests were conducted for both 
low and high trusters. For high trusters, the relationship between situational expectations 
and the willingness to commit was marginally significant, χ² (1) = 3.47, p = .06, showing that 
under low situational expectations, 56.7 % of them wanted to install a system of public com-
mitments, versus 33.3 % under high situational expectations, see Table 4.2.
Table 4.2  Willingness to Commit as a Function of Dispositional Trust and Situational Expectations (Experiment 2)
Low situational expectations High situational expectations
Low trust 31.3 % 55.6 %
High trust 56.7 % 33.3 %
Note: Scores indicate the percentage of participants that chose for a system of public commitment
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For low trusters, the relationship between situational expectations and the willingness to 
commit was also marginally significant, χ² (1) = 3.54, p = .06, showing that under high situ-
ational expectations, 55.6 % of them wanted to install a system of public commitments, 
versus 31.3 % under low situational expectations. Again, the effect of situational expecta-
tions for low trusters is completely the opposite of that for high trusters; low trusters want 
to invest in a system of public commitments when situational expectations are high, while 
high trusters want to invest in a system of public commitments when situational expecta-
tions are low.
The motive of maximizing collective outcomes
On the item “I want maximum outcomes for us as a group”, a 2 (Dispositional trust) by 2 
(Situational expectations) ANOVA showed an interaction effect, F(1,118) = 5.46, p < .05. Post 
hoc testing showed that high trusters scored marginally significantly higher on this item 
under low (M = 6.57) than under high situational expectations (M = 5.91, p = .07). The pattern 
is completely the opposite for low trusters, who scored higher under high situational expec-
tations (M = 6.30) than under low situational expectations (M = 5.78, p = .15, see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 The Importance of the Motive of Maximizing Collective Outcomes, as a Function of Dispositional Trust and 
Situational Expectations (Experiment 2)
Low situational expectations High situational expectations
Low trust 5.75 6.30
High trust 6.57 5.91
Note: Scores range from 1 (not all important) to 7 (very important).
Mediation
In our theoretical reasoning we assumed that the effects of our independent variables on 
the willingness to invest in a public commitment system would be mediated by the motiva-
tion to maximize collective outcomes. we tested for mediation using the steps described 
by baron and Kenny (1986). First, we performed a logistic regression with dispositional 
trust and situational expectations predicting willingness to commit. Results showed that 
the interaction of dispositional trust x situational expectations was significant in predicting 
the choice for public commitment, b = -.99, p = .01. when the item “I want maximum gain for 
us as a group” was added to the regression analysis, however, the interaction dropped in 
significance, b = -.86, p = .04. The Sobel test was significant (t = -2.08, p = .04), showing that 
the maximum gain for the group motive partially mediated the interaction of dispositional 








This second study replicated and extended our findings regarding the interaction effect of 
dispositional trust and situational expectations on the willingness to install a system of pub-
lic commitments found in Study 1. Again it was found that high trusters are more in favor of 
a system of public commitments under low situational expectations than under high situa-
tional expectations, while low trusters are more in favor of a system of public commitments 
under high situational expectations than under low situational expectations. This clearly 
indicates that people choose for a public commitment system when they are confronted with 
situation-specific information that is incongruent with their personal expectation derived 
from dispositional trust.
In this second study we also looked at a possible motive for choosing a system of public 
commitments. we found a significant interaction effect of dispositional trust and situational 
expectations on the motive to gain the most for the group, showing that this motive was most 
important for low trusters under high situational expectations and for high trusters under 
low situational expectations. we performed a mediation analysis and found that the motive 
for maximum joint outcomes partially mediated the interaction effect of dispositional trust 
and situational expectations on the choice for a system of public commitments.
Several possible shortcoming of Study 1 were addressed in the development of Study 2. 
we moved from a scenario to the laboratory, omitted a sentence that could have made sali-
ent the possibility of defection, and we made sure the system of public commitments was 
indeed costly for participants to install. Yet we managed to replicate the interaction effect 
found in Study 1.
General Discussion
Public commitment making is often used as an intervention technique to promote envi-
ronmental behaviors and is seen as very promising. Of course, the key to any intervention 
program’s success is people’s willingness to participate in it. This is especially true for 
commitment making as it relies heavily on the freedom of choice to make a commitment. 
The goal of the current research was to increase our insights in what determines whether 
people are willing to invest in public commitment making. Interestingly, this question has 
largely been ignored in previous research. Since environmental issues are, in essence, 
social dilemmas, we have tried to answer this question by looking at public commitment 
making as a structural solution to a social dilemma situation. The results from our two 
studies are in accordance with Yamagishi’s (1986b) structural goal/expectation theory. It 
appears that the same processes that determine the choice for structural solutions such 
as the installment of sanctioning systems and leadership, also determine their willingness 
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to invest in a system of public commitments. In all these situations, trust seems to play an 
important role.
However, our results not only corroborate structural goal/expectation theory: They also 
provide us with new insights in the willingness to invest in structural solutions. Our studies 
clearly show that dispositional trust is not the only factor that determines if people are in 
favor of structural change. Situational expectations play a role as well, showing that these 
processes are more complex than previously assumed.
People low in dispositional trust who have situation-specific information that voluntary 
contributions will be low, probably see no chance for realization of the public good and are 
thus not interested in investing their own resources in a possible solution. High trusters 
who have situation-specific information that voluntary contribution will be high, probably 
expect the public good to be realized based on those voluntary contributions and for that 
reason see no need to invest in a possible solution to ensure cooperation.
It is different when situational expectations are incongruent with personal expecta-
tions. High trusters generally rely on their group members’ spontaneous cooperation. Their 
general expectation is that others’ contributions will be high. If they are confronted with 
situational expectation that is incongruent, i.e. the message that others are not likely to 
contribute a lot, this signals to them that the public good might not be realized. One way to 
ensure realization of the public good is to make commitments.
Low trusters, on the other hand, do not trust their fellow group members to contribute. 
Their general expectation is that others will defect. If they hear that the other group mem-
bers’ voluntary contributions are likely to be high, this may signal that there is a chance of 
realization of the public good. As Yamagishi (1986b) states in his structural goal/expectation 
theory, low trusters will contribute to a structural solution of the dilemma when they have 
developed the goal of achieving mutual cooperation. The same process seems to be hap-
pening here: Low trusters choose for a system of public commitments to ensure realization 
of the public good. This is shown by the fact that the motive to gain maximum joint outcomes 
mediates the choice for a public commitment system for both low and high trusters. How-
ever, this effect should be interpreted with caution, as the mediation is only partial.
An issue that is important to consider is the fact that in our studies, we manipulated situ-
ational expectations independently of dispositional trust. It may be that in real life dilem-
mas, situational expectations and dispositional trust are confounded. However, since these 
studies were performed in order to gain insight in these processes, we deemed it essential 
to manipulate the central variables systematically. by doing so, we have the possibility to 
study all four different combinations of dispositional trust and situational expectations. This 
way, when these two are in fact confounded in real life dilemmas, the current research 
sheds light on the relative impact of both variables. This is of particular importance when 
bearing in mind that this research is meant help increase the effectiveness of commitment 
interventions in the environmental domain.
Of course the story does not end here. The results from our studies leave us with inter-
esting possibilities for future research. For instance, there are several other types of struc-
tural solutions to dilemma situations, such as implementing a reward system or appointing 
a leader who decides how much every group member has to contribute (Messick et al., 
1983). Future research could determine whether situational and general expectations also 
interact to predict preference for these structural changes.
Another question would be what causes the effect that commitment has on behavior. As 
mentioned earlier, Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, and Harris (1997) argued that people tend to 
adhere to previously made commitment because they experience an internal norm to do so. 
This is in line with Matthies et al. (2006) who find that commitment making is effective in 
changing travel behavior for those people in which a personal norm is activated. The mak-
ing of a commitment can also be thought of as a kind of implementation intention (bamberg, 
2002; Gollwitzer, 1999), whereby explicitly stating an intention leads to heightened attention 
for situational cues that a behavior can be performed. Yet another explanation may be that 
when people perceive that they freely chose to engage in a behavior this changes how they 
think about themselves and the behavior. If they freely chose to perform a behavior, they 
must have wanted to: They must have believed in the cause or expected to enjoy the behav-
ior. This is a standard principle of minimal justification techniques, on which much of the 
commitment literature is based (Cialdini, 2001; Katzev & Johnson, 1983). For an overview 
of these possible explanations for commitment making effects on environmental behavior, 
see Lokhorst, werner, Staats, and Van Dijk (2009).
we conducted this research out of an interest in commitment making as a useful tool 
to enhance pro-environmental behaviors. Previous research on commitment has predomi-
nantly focused on the effect it has on environmental behavior and environmental behavior 
change. The current paper has paid less attention to the effectiveness of commitment mak-
ing but has instead focused on the preceding question of when and why people will be willing 
to commit. As stated in the Introduction section of this paper, public commitment making is 
often used as an intervention strategy in environmental research. As we have seen, these 
studies usually show a positive effect of commitment making on behavior change, but at the 
same time are faced with participants who refuse to make a commitment. At this point it 
is not known what proportion of the population will not participate in commitment making, 
but it is clear that we cannot readily assume that an intervention consisting of public com-
mitments will always be effective. we hope this paper helps to understand why participants 
sometimes refuse to invest in commitment making and can help to improve the design of 
such commitment interventions. It would be interesting to test our hypotheses in the con-
text of field research and in that way contribute to the effectiveness of public commitment 
making as an intervention strategy for changing behavior in the environmental domain.
Chapter 5  
 
A Review of Commitment Making Strategies 
in Environmental Research1
1 This chapter is based on Lokhorst, werner, Staats, & Van Dijk (2009) and is therefore written in the first-
person plural.
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As threats of environmental degradation loom, there is increased interest determining 
how to induce people to engage in more environmentally friendly behaviors. In addition to 
legal regulations and financial incentives there is a clear interest among authorities and 
other organizations in stimulating people to voluntarily change their environmental behav-
iors. A number of intervention techniques are in use to accomplish this (see for example, 
Abrahamse et al., 2005). Interestingly, there appears to be a preference for one specific 
instrument, which is asking people to make a promise or pledge to do something for the 
environment2. Examples abound: the City of Chicago asks its residents to do their part for 
the environment and promise to perform five simple pro-environmental actions (www.
earthmonthchicago.com); the chair of biological Sciences of Arkansas State University pro-
posed to have students who want to contribute to save the environment wear a green ribbon 
during the graduation ceremony to show their commitment (http://media.www.asuherald.
com); the European Commission asks high school students to cooperate in reducing their 
impact on the environment and invites them to sign a document, as a group, co-signed by 
their teacher, promising that they will reduce their CO2 emissions, and send this document 
to the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/campaign/schools/
schools_en.htm); and finally the Dutch Automobile Association declares that October 9, 
2008, will become a day without traffic jams, asking drivers to endorse this initiative, in 
writing, on a website, by giving their name and address (http://www.denhaag.com/default.
asp?id=9579).
Inherent in the idea of asking for a promise is, of course, the expectation that people 
will feel obliged to keep it and will therefore behave accordingly. Even a negative example 
may demonstrate the potential power of the mechanism: when Madonna did not keep her 
promise to make her “Sticky & Sweet” Tour very environmentally friendly, she received 
severe criticism (http://www.ecorazzi.com). So, there may be consequences for not keeping 
a promise. but what form do they take, and are they strong enough to motivate individuals to 
keep their commitments? In other words, are these authorities who issue pledges, letters, 
green ribbons and what not, correct in assuming that these promises will be kept?
This chapter is about the validity of the assumption that commitments are an effec-
tive behavior change technique. we will review the scientific evidence that is available of 
whether, why, when and for whom making a promise to change environmentally relevant 
behavior leads to the intended results. we focus exclusively on interventions in which peo-
ple are induced to make commitments they otherwise would not have made. Research in 
which people spontaneously make commitments is valuable; however we could not find any 
examples in the environmental behavior change research literature. Similarly, although we 
think of commitment as just part of the total process by which behaviors are stimulated, 







sustained, and ultimately become habits (Verplanken & wood, 2006), we found no studies in 
which commitment and habits were connected.
A substantial amount of research has been done using commitment-making strategies 
to promote environment-friendly behavior. This line of research goes back to the classic 
experiments by Lewin (1947), in which participants who had the opportunity to discuss and 
come to a decision about new behaviors were more likely to change than those who heard 
a lecture on the same topic. Lewin’s group discussions contained several mechanisms that 
may account for the differential change in behavior. One mechanism is what we would now 
call a commitment technique, whereby group members make a commitment to change their 
behavior. Such commitment techniques have been applied in a number of environmental 
psychology studies over the past few years and seem to be effective compared to other 
techniques that rely on voluntary cooperation rather than incentives or sanctions. However, 
as outlined below, not all studies show a clear-cut positive effect. Also, the ways in which 
commitment is manipulated seem to vary greatly among the different studies.
In this chapter we identify possible underlying mechanisms that can explain the effects 
of commitment, and assess to what extent commitment manipulations currently used in 
environmental studies address these mechanisms. To do so, we will first look at fundamen-
tal social psychological research on commitment making. Then we review environmental 
studies that use a commitment manipulation, see to what extent they use these insights and 
how commitment making as an intervention can be improved.
Current views on commitment processes are strongly influenced by the social psycho-
logical insights of Cialdini (2001). In his seminal book on social influence he devotes a chap-
ter to the explanation of general commitment processes. In the current chapter it is our goal 
to extend these explanations by focussing specifically on research that aims to bring about 
environmental behavior change.
The most recent review on commitment strategies in the environmental domain was done 
by Katzev and wang in 1994. Consistent with Katzev and wang’s (1994) distinction between 
measured and manipulated commitment, we focus exclusively on commitment manipulations 
in which “a commitment is brought about by eliciting from individuals a pledge to perform a 
particular act” (p. 13). whereas Katzev and wang focused mainly on reporting the effects of 
commitment, we extend this work by analyzing the applied studies in view of recent literature 
on the psychological processes that underlie commitment, and in that way combine know-
ledge from both areas to improve our understanding of commitment making.
Theory
First, we will describe possible underlying psychological mechanisms that can account for 
the effect of commitment making on behavior change. we distinguish three of these mecha-
nisms: changes in self-concept (moderated by one’s need to be consistent with that self-
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concept), attitudinal processes, and social and personal norms. It is important to note that, 
although the commitment literature tends to treat these three constructs separately, oth-
ers are interested in how they work together to predict behavior (e.g., Conner & Armitage, 
1998; Terry, Hogg, & white, 1999), issues that are outside the realm of the present review.
Self-concept and the need for consistency
One theme in Cialdini’s (2001) explanations for commitment effects is that when people 
perceive that they freely chose to engage in a behavior this changes how they think about 
themselves and the behavior. If they freely chose to perform a behavior, they must have 
wanted to: They must have believed in the cause or expected to enjoy the behavior. This is a 
standard principle of minimal justification techniques, on which much of the commitment 
literature is based (Katzev & Johnson, 1983). The general idea is that when people view 
their behaviors as voluntary and not coerced, they conclude that they have come to these 
decisions by themselves and that their behaviors reflect their true motivation, their internal 
self or self-concept.
Self-concept, defined by bem (1972) as “an individual’s ability to respond differentially 
to his own behavior”, has been well studied in the foot- in-the-door (FITD) effect in which 
agreeing with a small request makes people more likely to complying with a subsequent 
larger request. burger’s (1999) meta-analysis of FITD suggested that the related mecha-
nisms of commitment, consistency needs, and consistency of self-perception were viable 
explanations for this effect (burger identified additional mechanisms which are less rel-
evant for the present review).
In the first FITD study, Freedman and Fraser (1966) showed that participants who agreed 
to a small request (putting a small sign in their windows promoting driving safety) were 
more likely to agree to the larger or “target” request (placing a large sign in their front lawn) 
than were participants who were only asked to perform the target request. In explaining 
this effect, Freedman and Fraser argued that compliance with an initial request informed 
participants about their personal character, that they were “the kind of person who does 
this sort of thing” (Freedman & Fraser, 1966, p 201). This interpretation was underscored 
by the high cooperation by a group of participants who had complied with an initial request 
about an unrelated topic. Their high cooperation to the target request suggested that their 
commitment transcended the particular issue and was related to a broader personal self-
concept as someone who helps with social causes.
In FITD studies, commitment is always induced by performance of an initial simple 
behavior (e.g., signing a petition) and when freely chosen, performing this behavior seems 
to change how people think about themselves. For instance, people who sign a petition to 
save energy will start to see themselves as people who care about conservation and will 







a change in self-concept is in line with self-perception theory (bem, 1972) which holds that 
people derive their self-concept from their actions. bem distinguished between freely cho-
sen (or “tacted”) and externally imposed behaviors (“manded”), and research consistently 
shows that cognitions and self-perceptions only change when people believe they had freely 
chosen to engage in the behavior. As Cialdini (2001, p 82) put it: “we accept inner respon-
sibility for a behavior when we think we have chosen to perform it in the absence of strong 
outside pressure”. Threats or rewards may produce compliance but not a feeling of commit-
ment, because people will not feel they are intrinsically motivated to perform the behavior 
at stake.
A great deal of evidence has been found for self-perception as a mediator for the FITD 
phenomenon (burger, 1999). As self-perception theory would predict, studies show that 
the more salient the initial request, the greater the compliance to the target request. Self-
perception theory would also predict that whether participants actually perform the initial 
request affects compliance to the target request. If people look at their own behavior to 
determine their self-concept then the self-perception process should not occur when the 
initial request is not performed, and this should in turn not lead to increased compliance. 
Indeed, the studies that burger (1999) described clearly show that performance of the initial 
request leads to greater compliance to the target request. For example, when people do 
not comply with the original request because it is too big, compliance to the target request 
drops significantly (burger, 1999).
Direct evidence for FITD leading to changed self-concept comes from a study done by 
burger and Caldwell (2003). In this study, participants complied with a small request by 
signing a petition and writing a statement about problems of homelessness. Immediately 
after this, they completed personality questionnaires designed to tap differences in self-
concept related to feeling compassion and helping with worthy causes. These participants 
described themselves as more willing to provide support and as more compassionate than 
a control group. They were also more likely to comply with the target request to volunteer 
with a food drive than the control group. Mediation analysis showed that the change in self-
concept mediated the FITD effect. Similar changes in self-concept were obtained in another 
study (burger & Guadagno, 2003).
Summarizing, self-perception processes are often seen as the driving force behind 
commitment and its corollary, the FITD effect. The suggested self-perception process 
works because people derive information about the self from previous behavior and then 
act accordingly in order to be consistent with that self-concept. However, as Cialdini, Trost 
and Newsom (1995) showed, people differ in their need for consistency. They designed and 
validated the Preference for Consistency Scale (PFC) which identifies the extent to which 
people describe themselves as favoring consistency. People who are high in PFC value per-
sonal consistency whereas those who are low in PFC prefer to be spontaneous and even 
avoid being congruent with previously made statements or behaviors. Using the PFC scale, 
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Cialdini et al. were able to replicate three consistency-based phenomena, but only for those 
high in PFC. Those high in a preference for consistency replicated a standard “balance” 
effect (they gave higher ratings to a person with whom they anticipated interacting), a stand-
ard dissonance effect (high choice to write a counter-attitudinal essay resulted in more atti-
tude change), and at a marginally significant level, a standard FITD effect (more agreement 
to a large target request after conceding to a small request). These effects did not appear 
for those low in preference for consistency.
To underscore the importance of PFC, Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, and Cialdini (2001) 
carried out a study on the FITD effect combining both the PFC and the self-concept explana-
tion. In their second study the authors were able to show that when participants low in PFC 
were made aware of the trait implications of their previous behavior (“you are a helpful per-
son”) they actually produced a reverse FITD effect. That is, compliance rates dropped sig-
nificantly in this condition. The authors concluded that when people with a low preference 
for consistency are confronted with their prior behavior, they are motivated to behave dif-
ferently in order to confirm their preference for spontaneity and even anti-consistency. That 
is, when prior cooperative behavior was made salient, low PFC participants were actually 
less likely to cooperate than when prior cooperative behavior had not been made salient. 
This means that although the process of self-perception is active in both low and high PFC’s, 
it leads to the FITD effect only in high PFC’s because they are motivated to act in accord-
ance with their prior behavior. As Guadagno et al. (2001) noted, “If there is no predilection 
for consistency within oneself, there is unlikely to be any tendency for consistency with the 
self-relevant implications of earlier compliance” (p. 866).
Although there seems to be evidence for the self-perception explanation of the FITD 
effect, it is not entirely clear how this process operates (burger, 1999). More precisely, it 
is not exactly clear what it is that changes when people agree to the initial request. Do 
they change their self-concepts about a specific behavior or to a more general cause? This 
is important for researchers whose goal is to change people’s environmental behaviors. 
Should they get people to commit to a specific behavior or to environmentalism in general? 
This issue will be examined further in the Discussion.
Attitudinal approach
A related approach to understanding the effect of commitment making on behavior change 
is offered by a cognitive attitudinal approach. If people commit themselves to engaging in 
a behavior, they need to develop ways of remembering to perform the behavior and they 
need to maintain their motivation to actually perform the behavior once reminded. External 
features might be used to remind and motivate people (e.g. notes, signs, recycling bins). 
However, it is also possible for people to develop internal motivators and reminders such as 







& Van Knippenberg, 2002; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). “Attitude strength” is a multi-
faceted construct (Krosnick, boninger, & Chuang, 1993; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995) 
that has interested researchers because strong attitudes are more predictive of behavioral 
intentions and behaviors. If making a commitment keeps the issue salient and activates 
cognitive processes such as “cognitive elaboration”, this could account for why commitment 
leads to long-term attitude and behavior change (e.g., Chaiken’s, 1987, Heuristic Systematic 
Model, or HSM; Petty & Cacioppo’s, 1986, Elaboration Likelihood Model or ELM). Favorable 
cognitive elaboration means that the individual thinks about reasons for engaging in the 
behavior and strategies for effectively performing the behavior; in the process of this elabo-
ration, the individual develops a strong and accessible attitude that serves both to remind 
and motivate the individual to engage in the behavior. As Pardini and Katzev (1983-1984, 
p. 253) argue, the making of commitments leads participants to “find their own reasons 
for recycling, to begin to even like doing so, and, as a result, to continue to perform these 
behaviors on their own.”
The making of commitments resembles the making of “implementation intentions” (Goll-
witzer, 1999), where an anticipated opportunity is linked to a certain goal-directed behavior. 
These implementation intentions take the format of “I intend to do y when situation z is 
encountered” and are hypothesized to activate the mental representation of the situation to 
perform a certain behavior in. This activation subsequently leads to a heightened attention 
for situational cues.
A study of recycling provides some support for the idea that commitment and follow-
through can increase cognitive elaboration and lead to more favorable attitudes about the 
behavior (werner et al., 1995). First, commitment was more effective at increasing recy-
cling than other forms of contact (flyer only; telephone and flyer; face to face and flyer). 
However, by the end of the 4 month study, all recyclers had more favorable attitudes than 
nonrecyclers, regardless of their initial recycling behavior or how they had been informed of 
the program (the attitude measure contained a variety of questions; attitudes, self-concept 
as a recycler, and behavioral intentions were rated most positively, whereas perceived nor-
mative pressures were rated lowest). This pattern was interpreted to indicate that commit-
ment had not led to mindless consistency, but instead participants had reflected on their 
recycling behavior and developed attitudes that supported and maintained their recycling.
Norms
Another explanation that could account for commitment making effects is based on a nor-
mative approach. It seems plausible to think that when a commitment is made in public, 
people will adhere to this commitment because of the possible negative social sanctions 
that will follow for breaking it (Abrahamse et al., 2005). This means that it is a social norm 
that mediates the effect of commitment on behavior. This explanation directly reflects Cial-
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dini’s (2001) recommendation that commitments should be made in public in order to be 
effective. It would mean that a commitment would not be effective when there is nobody 
around to witness it, because no social norm would be activated.
Another implication of the social norm explanation is that a commitment or initial request 
activates a particularly strong social norm when that commitment is made within a strong 
reference group. It is here that the level of group identification may also play a role. Terry, 
Hogg and white (1999) showed that group norms influence behavior primarily for people 
who strongly identify with that particular group. These ideas are consistent with the recom-
mendation given by werner (2003) that group discussions aimed at behavior change should 
be held within significant social groups.
Although the impact of public surveillance on adherence seems plausible, this has been 
complemented by more recent research on internalized norms. Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, 
and Harris (1997) developed a more nuanced explanation of the idea that commitments made 
in the public eye would be more effective. In their research, Kerr et al. specifically pitted 
the social norm explanation against the alternative explanation of a personal or internalized 
norm. In contrast to a social norm which depends on concerns about others, an internalized 
norm influences behavior even when there is no public surveillance. In two experiments, 
Kerr and his colleagues showed that anonymity did not reduce the effect of commitments 
on behavior: that is, participants kept their commitments whether their behavior was moni-
tored by others or not. Kerr et al. (1997) conclude that instead of a social norm, a personal 
norm must be at work. Thus, although the commitments were made in a public discussion 
with other involved participants, and none of them (not even the experimenter) would know 
whether the individual kept that commitment, the personal norm or responsibility for one’s 
commitments overruled any inclination for violating that commitment.
In this context it is relevant to note that when people perceive some kind of need for action, 
this can elicit considerations concerning the implications of behavior for one’s moral val-
ues. These considerations, in turn, produce feelings of moral obligation to perform or refrain 
from certain behaviors (Schwartz & Howard, 1984). These feelings of moral obligation are, in 
essence, personal norms. It could very well be that the making of a commitment serves as a 
situational cue indicating a need for action and in this way activates a personal norm.
when a personal norm becomes truly internalized it closely resembles the self-concept: 
the way people think about themselves. In fact, as Conner and Armitage (1998) argue, the 
way people think about themselves may be associated with having a set of values linked 
to a particular kind of behavior, and these values can lead to personal norms. This closely 
resembles what Thøgersen (2006) calls integrated norms: Deeply internalized norms that 







Comparison of self-concept and normative explanations for commitment
Do self-concept and norms work together in changing people’s behavior? In his review of the 
FITD effect, burger (1999) noted that receiving normative information can significantly change 
participants’ reactions to target requests. Interestingly, the self-perception and the norm 
explanation yield completely opposite predictions concerning performance of target requests. 
That is, when a person who complied with a first request receives the (social normative) mes-
sage that few people actually go along with this first request, the norm explanation would 
predict that this decreases the FITD effect. After all, people have a tendency to comply with 
social norms and this should subsequently inhibit compliance. However, the self-perception 
explanation predicts an increase of the FITD effect because the very fact that someone does 
something that very few others do, makes the behavior more idiosyncratic, more self-relevant 
and thus something to act in accordance with on the second request.
DeJong (1981) tested these predictions and found that people who heard that they were 
the only one so far to have performed the initial request were slightly less likely to comply 
with the target request than the control group. However, participants who received the mes-
sage that virtually everyone had agreed to the initial request were significantly more likely 
to comply with the target request than the control group. These results are consistent with 
the social norm information interpretation and show that people do base their behavior on 
normative information. Most FITD or commitment studies do not confront participants with 
counter normative messages. These results clearly show that people’s tendency to conform 
to a norm has a significant impact on their behavior and may even overrule self-perception 
effects (see also Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007, for how injunctive 
messages can counter the undermining effect of normative information).
Now that we have discussed possible psychological mechanisms that can account 
for commitment making effects, we will turn to studies of environmental behaviors that 
included commitment strategies. Special attention will be paid to how the commitment was 
administered and how effective it was in both the short and the long term. we will then 
return to the possible psychological bases of commitment effects and see to what extent 
there is empirical evidence to support them.
Environmental studies that use a commitment manipulation
In the next section we will review environmental research containing a commitment manip-
ulation. we include all environmental commitment studies we found3. First, we will look at 
main effects of commitment: was commitment successful compared to the control group? 
3 The study done by bachman and Katzev (1982) on the effects of commitment on bus ridership was omitted 
since the method section did not provide enough information to evaluate the study.
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After that, we will review studies that combined commitment with another type of interven-
tion and report whether the combination was more effective than commitment alone. we 
will organize that section according to the second intervention’s potential to lead to inter-
nalization; we start with more external interventions (e.g., feedback) and move to internal 
ones (e.g., labelling). The short-term and long-term results of all studies, as well as the 
characteristics of the commitment manipulations and the dependent variables, are sum-
marized in Table 5.1.
Commitment only effects
Several studies have shown a positive effect of commitment making on behavior change. For 
instance, burn and Oskamp (1986) carried out a commitment intervention that was aimed 
at household recycling. Participants in the commitment conditions were approached by a 
boy Scout who asked them to sign a pledge card. If they signed the pledge, the scout handed 
them a sticker to post in their home to remind them to recycle. It is not clear how many 
participants actually signed the card. Results of this study showed a significant difference 
between the commitment condition and the control group in frequency of recycling during 
the pledge period; no long-term follow-up data were collected. No additional constructs 
were measured in this study and it is thus not clear which underlying psychological process 
was influenced by this manipulation of commitment.
In another neighbourhood recycling study, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of four conditions for introducing a new curb side pickup program (flyer only; telephone and 
flyer; face to face and flyer; and written commitment and flyer; werner et al., 1995). Four 
parallel streets were included in the study, and all residents on a street were assigned to 
the same condition (total n= 309). Results indicated that a signature commitment was sig-
nificantly more effective at inducing regular recycling than the other three conditions. This 







Table 5.1 Summary of environmental studies using a commitment manipulation
Commitment Effective: Short Term 
(Treatment in Place)
Commitment Effective: Longer Term (Treatment Ended)
Author, date Dependent variables Commitment manipulation Commitment only Commitment Plus Commitment only Commitment Plus 
Burns & Oskamp (1986) Household recycling (all 
materials; 
city program)
Boy Scout project; asked resident to 
sign pledge card; provided reminder 
sticker in both Commitment conditions
C-only vs. ctrl, p< .05 a) C+persuasive message 
vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+persuasive message 
vs. C-only, n.s.
c) C+persuasive message 
vs. persuasive message 
only, n.s.
Werner et al., 1995 Household recycling Signed commitment versus information 
via flyer, telephone, or face to face
Signed commitment 
most effective for 
repeated recycling, 
p < .05
Signed commitment most effective for 3 of 4 months
Pardini & 
Katzev (1983-84)
Newspaper recycling Weak commitment: Face to face verbal 
commitment; Strong commitment: Face 
to face signed commitment




Weeks 3 & 4: Strong commitment group maintained recycling; weak 
commitment group did not.
Wang & Katzev (1990) 
Experiment 1
Paper recycling Retirement home ABA design; Group 
meeting; signed group commitment
Commitment vs. 
baseline, p< .003
4-wk follow-up C-group vs. baseline, p< .004
Katzev & Pardini 
(1987-88)
Newspaper recycling Undergraduate experimenter; resident 
signed form making a 5-week recycling 
commitment; both experimenter and 
resident kept copy of form
Frequency C-only vs. 
ctrl, p < .01
Weight C-only vs. ctrl, 
p < .001
Frequency
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .01
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, 
n.s.
Weight
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .02
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, 
n.s.
3-week follow-up:
Frequency C-only vs. ctrl, n.s.
Weight C-only vs. ctrl, n.s.
3-week follow-up:
Frequency
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, p < .01
Weight
a) C+token vs. ctrl, n.s
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, n.s.
DeLeon & Fuqua (1995) Recycling Mailed request. P signed form and 
mailed back; names to be published 
in newsletter; 55 % (C only) and 75 % 
(C+) committed; data presented for all.
C-only vs. ctrl, n.s. a) C + group feedback, 
p < .02; increase due only 
to those who committed)
Matthies et al. (2006) Use of alternative 
transportation 
(bus, metro, bike, etc.)
Personal request; Written; public to 
research team; all committed, but only 
38/191 participants chose to commit 
to transit
No ME for C-only 
predicting DV 
(phase 2 or 3, p > .10)
a) C + free ticket 
(phase 2 or 3, 
p > .10)
b) C by personal norm 
interaction 
(phase 3, p < .03)
Week 25 Follow-up: No ME for C-only predicting DV Week 25 Follow-up: C by personal norm interaction, 
p < .08
Cobern et al. (1995) Grass cycling Personal request. Signed card to grass 
cycle for 4 weeks; public to research 
team. 70 % in C-only agreed; 80 % in 
C+ agreed; data presented for all.
C-only vs. ctrl, n.s. a) C + agent (block leader) 
vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C + agent (block leader) 
vs. C-only, p < .05
Immediate Follow-up: C-only v. ctrl, n.s.
1-year Follow-up: Returned to baseline
Immediate Follow-up:
a) C+ Block Leader v. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+ Block Leader v. C-only, p < .05
1-year Follow-up: Returned to baseline
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Table 5.1 Summary of environmental studies using a commitment manipulation
Commitment Effective: Short Term 
(Treatment in Place)
Commitment Effective: Longer Term (Treatment Ended)
Author, date Dependent variables Commitment manipulation Commitment only Commitment Plus Commitment only Commitment Plus 
Burns & Oskamp (1986) Household recycling (all 
materials; 
city program)
Boy Scout project; asked resident to 
sign pledge card; provided reminder 
sticker in both Commitment conditions
C-only vs. ctrl, p< .05 a) C+persuasive message 
vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+persuasive message 
vs. C-only, n.s.
c) C+persuasive message 
vs. persuasive message 
only, n.s.
Werner et al., 1995 Household recycling Signed commitment versus information 
via flyer, telephone, or face to face
Signed commitment 
most effective for 
repeated recycling, 
p < .05
Signed commitment most effective for 3 of 4 months
Pardini & 
Katzev (1983-84)
Newspaper recycling Weak commitment: Face to face verbal 
commitment; Strong commitment: Face 
to face signed commitment




Weeks 3 & 4: Strong commitment group maintained recycling; weak 
commitment group did not.
Wang & Katzev (1990) 
Experiment 1
Paper recycling Retirement home ABA design; Group 
meeting; signed group commitment
Commitment vs. 
baseline, p< .003
4-wk follow-up C-group vs. baseline, p< .004
Katzev & Pardini 
(1987-88)
Newspaper recycling Undergraduate experimenter; resident 
signed form making a 5-week recycling 
commitment; both experimenter and 
resident kept copy of form
Frequency C-only vs. 
ctrl, p < .01
Weight C-only vs. ctrl, 
p < .001
Frequency
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .01
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, 
n.s.
Weight
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .02
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, 
n.s.
3-week follow-up:
Frequency C-only vs. ctrl, n.s.
Weight C-only vs. ctrl, n.s.
3-week follow-up:
Frequency
a) C+token vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, p < .01
Weight
a) C+token vs. ctrl, n.s
b) C+token vs. C-Only, n.s.
c) C+token vs. token only, n.s.
DeLeon & Fuqua (1995) Recycling Mailed request. P signed form and 
mailed back; names to be published 
in newsletter; 55 % (C only) and 75 % 
(C+) committed; data presented for all.
C-only vs. ctrl, n.s. a) C + group feedback, 
p < .02; increase due only 
to those who committed)
Matthies et al. (2006) Use of alternative 
transportation 
(bus, metro, bike, etc.)
Personal request; Written; public to 
research team; all committed, but only 
38/191 participants chose to commit 
to transit
No ME for C-only 
predicting DV 
(phase 2 or 3, p > .10)
a) C + free ticket 
(phase 2 or 3, 
p > .10)
b) C by personal norm 
interaction 
(phase 3, p < .03)
Week 25 Follow-up: No ME for C-only predicting DV Week 25 Follow-up: C by personal norm interaction, 
p < .08
Cobern et al. (1995) Grass cycling Personal request. Signed card to grass 
cycle for 4 weeks; public to research 
team. 70 % in C-only agreed; 80 % in 
C+ agreed; data presented for all.
C-only vs. ctrl, n.s. a) C + agent (block leader) 
vs. ctrl, p < .05
b) C + agent (block leader) 
vs. C-only, p < .05
Immediate Follow-up: C-only v. ctrl, n.s.
1-year Follow-up: Returned to baseline
Immediate Follow-up:
a) C+ Block Leader v. ctrl, p < .05
b) C+ Block Leader v. C-only, p < .05







Commitment Effective: Short Term 
(Treatment in Place)
Commitment Effective: Longer Term (Treatment Ended)





Signed consent form, “C-public” 
understood names would be in paper 
as “public spirited fuel-conserving 
citizens.” Both public and private 
commitment groups heard 20 mins. 
information about effectives ways to 
save energy.
Natural gas
a) C-public vs. ctrl, 
p < .05
Electricity
a) C-public vs. ctrl, 
p < .05
Natural gas
a) C-public vs. C-private, 
p < .05
Electricity
a) C-public vs. C-private, 
p < .05
12 month follow-up Natural gas
a) C-public vs. ctrl, p < .01 for use period, 
winter months only
Electricity (central air conditioning)
a) C-public vs. ctrl, p < .03, all year
Electricity (window air conditioning)
a) C-public vs. 
ctrl, p < .01, summer only
12 month follow-up
a) C-public vs. C-private, p < .01 for use period, 
winter months only
Electricity (central air conditioning)
a) C-public vs. C-private, p < .03, all year
Electricity (window air conditioning)
a) C-public vs. C-private, p < .01, summer only





Mild commitment: Newspaper ad 
thanking for conserving, listing names 
of firms in program.
Strong commitment: Newspaper ad 
thanking for conserving and listing 
amount conserved by each firm.
a) C-mild vs. ctrl, 
p < .03
b) C-strong vs. ctrl, 
p < .03
c) C-strong vs. 
C-mild, p < .03, 
C-mild conserved 
more
Wang & Katzev (1990) 
Experiment 2
Paper recycling College dorms
Group commitment: Two group 
meetings, then signed group form (1 
refused).
Individual commit:
One contact, signed individual form (1 
refused).
DV = Frequency
a) C-group vs. ctrl, 
p< .001
b) C-individual vs. 
ctrl, p< .001
c) C-individual vs. 




a) C-group vs. ctrl, 
n.s.
b) C-individual vs. 
ctrl, p< .001
c) C-individual vs. 
C-group (not 
reported).
4-wk follow-up DV = Frequency
a) C-group vs. ctrl, n.s.
b) C-individual vs. ctrl, p< .01
c) C-individual vs. C-group, (not reported)
DV = Weight
No differences
Note: Articles are listed in the order discussed in the manuscript. 
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Commitment Effective: Short Term 
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Commitment Effective: Longer Term (Treatment Ended)
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ctrl, p < .01, summer only
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Electricity (window air conditioning)
a) C-public vs. C-private, p < .01, summer only
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Strong commitment: Newspaper ad 
thanking for conserving and listing 
amount conserved by each firm.
a) C-mild vs. ctrl, 
p < .03
b) C-strong vs. ctrl, 
p < .03
c) C-strong vs. 
C-mild, p < .03, 
C-mild conserved 
more
Wang & Katzev (1990) 
Experiment 2
Paper recycling College dorms
Group commitment: Two group 
meetings, then signed group form (1 
refused).
Individual commit:
One contact, signed individual form (1 
refused).
DV = Frequency
a) C-group vs. ctrl, 
p< .001
b) C-individual vs. 
ctrl, p< .001
c) C-individual vs. 




a) C-group vs. ctrl, 
n.s.
b) C-individual vs. 
ctrl, p< .001
c) C-individual vs. 
C-group (not 
reported).
4-wk follow-up DV = Frequency
a) C-group vs. ctrl, n.s.
b) C-individual vs. ctrl, p< .01
c) C-individual vs. C-group, (not reported)
DV = Weight
No differences







As described in a previous section, people who recycled had the most favourable attitudes 
at the end of the project, regardless of treatment condition. werner et al. interpreted this to 
indicate that attitudes had become more favourable and more accessible because of par-
ticipation in the program, and discounted the idea that a mindless need for consistency had 
driven the commitment group to recycle.
Pardini and Katzev (1983-84) studied the effect of strength of commitment on news-
paper recycling. Their experiment consisted of three conditions. The first was information, in 
which participants were informed about the recycling project by means of a leaflet. Second 
was the minimal commitment condition, in which participants were given the same informa-
tion and were asked by the experimenter to verbally commit to recycling in the next two 
weeks. Finally, in the strong commitment condition, the same procedure was carried out but 
participants were asked to sign a commitment form.
During the intervention phase, both commitment groups recycled more frequently than 
the information group; the commitment groups did not differ from each other. During the 
2-week follow-up phase, however, recycling frequency in the minimal commitment condi-
tion dropped, while recycling frequency in the strong commitment condition remained high. 
This difference supports Cialdini’s (2001) recommendation that a commitment should be 
active in order to have long-term effects. Since no additional constructs were measured, it 
is not possible to identify which psychological process mediated the effect of commitment 
on recycling.
wang and Katzev (1990, Experiment 1) showed that group commitment is effective in 
increasing recycling. In their study, residents of a retirement home were first given general 
information about paper recycling. At a later time, the participants met with the experimenter 
for a discussion about the importance of recycling which ended with elicitation of a group 
commitment to recycle. Participants were told that, if the recycling program were to continue, 
the experimenter needed to know that there were enough interested participants. They were 
asked to sign a group commitment form that stated “we, the residents of the 2nd floor, are will-
ing to participate in the paper recycling project sponsored by the Reed College Environmental 
Group. It is understood that any recyclable paper can be placed in the “recycle” garbage can. 
we commit ourselves to participating in this recycling project for the next 4 weeks.” Of the 22 
participants present, 17 signed the consent form. Results showed that after the group com-
mitment manipulation, recycling increased by 47 % compared to baseline. During a 4-week 
follow-up (when participants were no longer bound by their commitment) recycling rates 
remained high, making this commitment manipulation a successful one. This study differs 
from other studies reviewed here because of the emphasis on group commitment instead of 
an individual commitment. It might be that participants in this study experienced a group norm 
to follow up on their commitments. Unfortunately, no measures of attitudes, self-concepts or 
group norms were measured, but the nature and success of the manipulation indicates that a 
group norm might have mediated the effect of commitment.
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Katzev and Pardini (1987-88) compared the single and combined effects of token reinforcers 
(coupons) and commitment making on increasing recycling. Participants in the commit-
ment conditions were asked to sign a commitment form. It is not reported whether or not 
everyone complied with this request. Results of this study showed that during the 5-week 
intervention phase, all three experimental conditions (commitment, token, and combined 
commitment and token) yielded increased recycling, without one being more effective than 
the other. However, during the 3-week follow-up period, recycling remained high in the 
commitment and combined conditions but decreased significantly in the token condition. 
The combined intervention was most successful in terms of frequency and weight measures 
of recycling. The commitment condition was most effective in terms of number of house-
holds that recycled at least once. These results are clearly promising since they show that 
relatively long term effects can be achieved with interventions containing commitments. 
Again, no additional constructs were measured in this study and it is thus not clear which 
underlying psychological process was operating in this study.
Summarizing, we have found four studies that show a main effect of a commitment 
manipulation on pro-environmental behavior. None of these studies include additional psy-
chological constructs that could explain this effect and it is thus not possible to draw strong 
conclusions concerning possible mediators. However, the study done by wang and Katzev 
(1990, Experiment 1) suggests that a group norm might have been active, causing the effect 
of commitment making on behavior.
Commitment combined with other treatments
The previous studies showed a simple main effect for commitment; we will now look at 
studies that combine commitment with other interventions.
Commitment and group feedback
DeLeon and Fuqua (1995) examined the single and joint effects of public commitment and 
performance feedback on curbside recycling. In their paper they identified public commit-
ment making as an intervention strategy that would activate social pressure from peer 
group members to perform a certain behavior; they promised publicity for participants to 
underscore this aspect. An additional purpose of this study was to evaluate the effective-
ness of mailing commitment forms so as to make commitment manipulations more practi-
cal and cost effective for widespread use. Residents of a student housing complex were first 
invited to participate in a recycling program. Of those who returned an informed consent 
form, half were assigned to commitment conditions. After a 6-week no treatment base-
line period, those in the commitment groups were asked to sign and return a consent form 







monthly newsletter under a caption describing them as people who are “concerned about 
the future of our environment”. In the commitment-only condition, 11 out of 20 households 
signed and returned the form, and 14 of 19 did so in the commitment combined with group 
feedback condition. However, to control for the possibility of self-selection, all 39 partici-
pants who received the request were included in analyses. Feedback was provided weekly 
by taping a note to participants’ doors describing how their group had done and promising 
to print the feedback in the weekly student newspaper.
The commitment-only condition showed a modest increase in recycling over base-
line, but this effect did not reach significance. The commitment plus feedback condition 
significantly increased their recycling, however, this effect was primarily due to recycling 
by participants who had signed and returned the consent form, leaving self-selection as a 
plausible rival explanation for the results. Students in a control condition (initial consent 
only) and a feedback only condition did not change their recycling over time. It is important 
to note that participants in all four conditions were residents of the same apartment build-
ing and that their recycling was visible to others. This may have activated competition and/
or normative pressure among some participants which might have led to an increase in 
recycling that cannot be attributed to the intervention itself.
The fact that participants who received both the commitment and the feedback manipu-
lation significantly increased their recycling is particularly interesting because it provides 
support for the attitudinal approach described in the previous section of this chapter. Feed-
back might serve as a reminder of the commitment, making this commitment more salient 
and there by setting in motion more cognitive elaboration, which in turn leads to behavior 
change. However, the nature of the feedback manipulation might also have activated a norm 
to recycle. That is, the feedback given in this study was on the group level, which might 
have elicited a group norm. Unfortunately, constructs such as norms or salience were not 
measured in this study.
This study shows that (group) feedback can significantly enhance a commitment manip-
ulation. Although the results are very promising, it is not clear at this point if the effect of 
combining feedback with commitments on behavior is mediated by increased salience, a 
group norm, or another process.
Commitment and personal norms
Mathhies, Klockner and Preissner (2006) combined commitment and normative pressures 
in a study designed to increase use of alternative modes of transportation (i.e., transit, bike 
riding, walking, etc. at least once in a two-week period). The study involved a 2-week base-
line, then three 2-week intervention periods, and a 2-week follow-up 18 weeks later. Using 
Schwartz and Howard’s (1981) “norm activation” model, Matthies et al. reasoned that a com-
mitment could activate and stabilize participants’ pre-existing personal norms. In essence, 
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they hypothesized that commitment would have its strongest effect on people who had a 
pre-existing personal norm to reduce automobile use (e.g., would agree with items such as 
“feel obliged to use a car as seldom as possible” p. 98). Their analyses provide support for 
these ideas. In tests of moderation, they found that the commitment by personal norm inter-
action significantly predicted using transportation alternatives when measured 4 weeks and 
21 weeks (marginally) after the commitment had been made. Furthermore the interaction 
effects eliminated the simple effects of commitment, showing only moderation.
The results are particularly impressive because the commitment manipulation itself 
was fairly weak and automobile use was a strong, habitual preference. Participants were 
not asked to commit to the target behavior. Instead, in order to provide a sense of behavio-
ral choice, participants were given a list of 10 ways of reducing global warming, only two of 
which were directly related to the target behavior (indeed, only 38 of 191 participants chose 
the transit options). On the whole, the study provides an important new way to construe the 
role of commitment in behavior change and provides intriguing support that pre-existing 
personal norms can be activated with a commitment manipulation.
Commitment and consonant acts
Cobern, Porter, Leeming and Dwyer (1995) conducted a study in which they examined the 
effects of two types of commitment on residential grass recycling. Participants were asked 
to commit to grass recycling and, in a second condition, were also asked to talk to their 
neighbours about recycling. The commitment to the target behavior was written, but the 
commitment to talk to their neighbours was done verbally. both types of commitment were 
made with the experimenters present. Results showed that only participants who made 
both types of commitment significantly changed their behavior.
In this study, the same process might operate as in Kiesler’s (1971) study on strength of 
commitment as a function of the number of consonant acts performed. In his study, Kiesler 
found that participants who had performed three consonant acts were less influenced by a 
counter-attack than participants who had performed one act or no acts at all. He concluded 
that increasing the number of consonant acts increased the degree of commitment to the 
attitudinal position. In the Cobern et al. (1995) study, the verbal and written commitments 
could be considered as consonant acts. Possibly, the two combine to make the commitment 
itself more salient, thereby increasing its effectiveness. An additional possibility is that the 
act of persuading others can serve as a way of persuading the self. This study seems to 
provide support for the attitudinal approach: The increased salience of the commitment 
might lead to more cognitive elaboration, which would account for the change in behavior. 
Unfortunately, neither cognitive elaboration nor attitudes were measured in this study, so a 








Another way of improving a commitment manipulation is to label participants according 
to their commitment. Pallak and Cummings (1976) conducted a study with a commitment 
manipulation aimed at energy conservation. They approached participants with the request 
to start saving energy. One half of the participants were told that their names would appear 
in the local newspaper as energy conserving citizens. After a month the homeowners in this 
sample saved significantly more energy then the control group. Then, the participants were 
told that it would not be possible to publicize their names in the paper after all. For a period 
of 12 months the researchers measured the energy usage of these families. It appeared 
that during these months they had actually conserved more fuel than during the time they 
believed their names would be printed in the newspaper (Pallak & Cummings, 1976).
Especially noteworthy in this study is that participants in the public commitment condi-
tion were told that their names would be listed as “public-spirited, fuel-conserving citi-
zens”. Labelling them as such seems to refer directly to their self-concepts as “the kind 
of people who do such things”. Although the researchers did not measure any changes in 
self-concept it might very well be that this is exactly what happened in this condition. Given 
the fact that this study shows a significant effect of commitment, it offers indirect support 
for the self-concept explanations for commitment making.
Recall that DeLeon and Fuqua (1995) had also told participants in their public commit-
ment condition that their names would be publicized. In their study, names would appear in 
a monthly newsletter as people who are “concerned about the future of our environment”. 
However, in their study the commitment manipulation in itself did not have a significant 
effect on behavior. we believe this might be due at least in part to the wording that they 
used, which did not refer to the particular target behavior and therefore to a particular 
aspect of the self-concept. In contrast, Pallak and Cummings (1976) labelled their partici-
pants as “public-spirited, fuel-conserving citizens” which both addresses the self-concept 
and is specific to the target behavior under study.
More evidence for the effect of labelling comes from research by Cialdini et al. (1998) 
on “undermining the undermining effect”, in which the authors show that behavior that is 
rewarded and thus runs the risk of losing intrinsic motivation can be perceived as intrin-
sically motivating if people are told that the behavior stems from an internal trait. Taken 
together, these studies strongly suggest that combining a commitment manipulation with a 
labelling technique results in strong effect on behavior.
However, caution is advised, since labelling participants may backfire. Shippee and Gre-
gory (1982) studied the effect of public commitment on energy conservation. They recruited 
23 firms in Jackson, Michigan, to participate in an energy conservation program and divided 
them into three conditions: control, mild commitment and strong commitment. Participants 
in the mild commitment condition were told that their names would appear in the local news 
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paper with the words “Jackson thanks you”. In the strong commitment condition, participants’ 
names were also published, but their actual energy savings would be included in the adver-
tisements. Results showed no significant differences in electricity usage across conditions. 
However, an analysis on natural gas consumption revealed that the mild commitment condi-
tion used less natural gas than did the strong commitment condition, and that the firms in the 
strong commitment condition used less than those in the control condition. Contrary to the 
experimenters’ hypotheses, the mild commitment manipulation yielded the greatest effect. 
Apparently, as became clear from survey responses, participants in the strong commitment 
condition experienced reactance to the manipulation. The authors suggested that the firms 
in this condition were not able to show significant energy reduction, which made them simply 
“quit trying”. This is a very important aspect of this study. Although other studies (e.g. DeLeon 
& Fuqua, 1995) have shown that commitment and feedback combined can have a significant 
positive effect on behavior, this study clearly shows the detrimental effect of making that feed-
back public before participants learn how to change their behavior. Failure to improve behav-
ior can then cause public embarrassment, reactance and withdrawal.
Summarizing, this set of studies shows that labelling participants can be a very useful 
tool for enhancing the effect of commitment making. These findings are corroborated by 
findings from fundamental research: Cialdini et al. (1998) have shown that labelling can 
elicit internal motivation that is so strong it is able to undermine the undermining effect 
of external rewards. However, labelling must be used with caution, as we have seen in the 
Shippee and Gregory (1982) study, where combining labelling with public feedback elicited 
reactance and had a detrimental effect on behavior.
Commitment and group norms
wang and Katzev (1990, Experiment 2) compared the group commitment technique with an 
individual commitment and an incentive-based procedure. In this experiment, participants 
were 87 college students. The intervention period lasted 4 weeks after which there was 
2-week spring break followed by a 3-week follow-up period. The experimental conditions 
were randomly assigned to four wings in two dormitories. Participants in the control condi-
tion were given a flyer explaining the start of a paper recycling project; each room received 
a recycling bag. In the group commitment condition, students heard a 5-minute informa-
tional speech on the recycling project, after which they were instructed to discuss the issue 
amongst themselves. Participants were then asked to sign a commitment form stating: 
“we, the residents of [name of hall], are willing to participate in the paper recycling project. 
we understand that the recyclable paper needs to be placed outside our room on Friday 
mornings by 11 A.M. for the paper to be picked up. we commit ourselves to participating in 
this recycling project for the next 4 weeks.” 18 Out of the 19 students in this condition signed 







ment condition, students were approached individually and asked to sign a slightly modified 
version of the group commitment form. Twenty-four of the 25 participants in this condition 
signed the form. After signing, each participant received a flyer and a plastic bag.
As dependent measures the experimenters looked at both the frequency of recycling 
and the weight of the recycled paper. For recycling frequency, during the intervention phase 
all three experimental groups recycled more than the control condition, and the individual 
commitment condition recycled more than the group commitment condition. Looking at the 
weight of the recycled paper, participants in the individual commitment condition recycled 
the most. During follow-up, recycling frequency dropped significantly for all three experi-
mental conditions. Only the individual commitment condition still recycled more frequently 
than the control condition. There were no significant differences across conditions in terms 
of amount of paper recycled during follow-up.
The commitments made in the study were basically the same both in the group and 
the individual commitment condition. Yet it was the individual commitment manipulation 
that had the stronger effect in this study. why? One possibility is that in the group commit-
ment condition, participants did not make a personal pledge to change their behavior. As 
discussed previously, there is evidence that commitments are effective when they change 
people’s self-concept and that people come to think of themselves as “the kind of people 
who do this”. It might have been that the group commitment manipulations did not appeal 
to self-concept and therefore was not successful. Another possibility was suggested by the 
authors in comparing this pattern with the results of a previous experiment (wang & Katzev, 
1990, Experiment 1). It might be that the group in which the commitment was made was not 
a very cohesive one. As we have suggested before, group dynamics such as cohesiveness 
and identification might be important variables to take into account when studying group 
commitment. It might very well be that within a cohesive group with which its members 
strongly identify, a group commitment would be very effective since it activates a group 
norm that people are sensitive to and concerns behaviors that others in the group can moni-
tor. A related interpretation is that the group was cohesive and talked about the commit-
ment meeting after the experimenters had gone. If they agreed among themselves that they 
had only signed to be polite, that would undermine their commitment to their pledge. All of 
these possibilities should be considered in future research or behavior change programs.
Summarizing, this study shows a significant effect of commitment making on recycling 
behavior. It leaves interesting clues concerning possible mediators of this effect. Results show 
that the appeal made to the self-concept by manipulating a personal commitment was effec-
tive; whereas the appeal to the group norm (by manipulating a group commitment) was not. 
The failure of the group commitment to produce behavior change might be due to group vari-
ables such as cohesiveness, identification and visibility that either were absent and could not 
support the new behavior, or that were present but were turned against the request to recycle. 
Unfortunately, concepts such as self-concept, norms and group variables were not measured 
in this experiment.
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Comparing environmental studies to theory
In the introduction section of this chapter we described possible underlying processes 
responsible for the commitment effect: self-concept and preference for consistency, atti-
tudes and cognitive elaboration, and personal and social norms. After reviewing the envi-
ronmental studies it is important to reflect on the evidence they show for the different 
possible mediators. Most of the studies we reviewed (with the exception of Matthies et al., 
2006, and werner et al., 1995) do not include measures of psychological constructs that 
might mediate the effect of commitment. As a consequence it is not possible to say whether 
different strategies for manipulating commitment activate different psychological proc-
esses, or which of the possible mediators has the greatest effect on behavior. we believe 
that future commitment research can be significantly improved by first investigating more 
specifically which of the possible mediators is most important, designing manipulations so 
that they effectively activate that construct, and including measures of all the constructs to 
see which are operating.
Attitudes and cognitions can be important for motivating and maintaining behaviors. Several 
of the studies reviewed in this chapter appear to indicate that the effect of commitment can 
be enhanced by increasing its salience. Feedback, for instance, as applied in de DeLeon and 
Fuqua (1995), can help remind people of their commitment. In the Cobern et al. (1995) study, 
participants who committed to both grass recycling and talking to their neighbours about 
grass recycling showed the greatest behavior change. In this case, persuading others might 
have helped persuading the self and by doing so increasing the salience of the commit-
ment. Results of both these studies clearly support the cognitive approach that holds that 
making a commitment keeps the issue salient and sets in motion cognitive processes like 
cognitive elaboration, which accounts for long-term attitude and behavior change. werner 
et al. (1995) suggested that active recycling had led to more favourable recycling attitudes, 
behavioral intentions, and self-concepts (contrary to a hypothesis that commitment led to 
recycling based only on a drive for consistency). A follow-up two years later showed that 
people with strong attitudes at time 1 were more likely to have maintained recycling over 
the years (werner & Makela, 1998). werner and Makela focused on the importance of intrin-
sic motivation, and showed that people with strong time 1 attitudes had maintained their 
behavior by creating intrinsic interest in recycling.
Personal or social norms were evident in two studies reviewed in this chapter. The Mat-
thies et al. (2006) study showed that commitment is effective in increasing use of alterna-
tive modes of transportation for people who have a pre-existing personal norm to do so. In 
this study, the effect of commitment on behavior was not mediated by a personal norm, but 







The two experiments performed by wang and Katzev (1992) seemed to be aimed at acti-
vating a group norm. It appeared that this activation was successful in Experiment 1, where 
participants who made a group commitment recycled more than participants in the con-
trol group. However, in Experiment 2, the group commitment was less successful than the 
individual commitment. As pointed out earlier, we believe this might have been due to the 
dynamics of this particular group. Aiming at activating a group norm could very well be 
successful in a more cohesive group or one in which the cohesiveness was turned towards 
supporting the requested behavior.
The self-concept explanation of commitment was supported by another set of studies. 
The Pallak and Cummings (1976) study showed a strong effect of commitment combined with 
labelling, which, as we have argued before, can enhance the shift in self-concept needed for 
behavior change. The study by Shippee and Gregory (1982) showed the same positive effect 
in the mild commitment condition, although due to the public feedback this effect backfired 
in the strong commitment condition. Research by Cialdini et al. (1998) showed that labelling 
can counter the undermining effect of external justifications for behavior. This research 
showed that by giving children a trait label, the damage of a reward on their motivation 
to write well could be reversed. by implication, commitment manipulations that include a 
behavior-specific label should be more effective than those that do not provide the label. 
Although this comparison has not been made within a single experiment, the studies by Pal-
lak and Cummings (1976) and Shippee and Gregory (1982) are very promising and support 
the need for additional research on this strategy.
The work done by Cialdini et al. (1995) and others (Guadagno et al., 2001) suggests that 
we should not look at self-perception without taking personal need for consistency into 
account since activation of the self-concept will have differential effects for those low and 
high in their need for consistency. Unfortunately we do not know how Preference for Con-
sistency is distributed across the population. It might very well be that the mixed results of 
commitment studies are (partly) due to a large number of participants who have a low level 
of preference for consistency and thus actively try and behave inconsistently. To the best of 
our knowledge no research has examined the distribution of PFC scores in our society. Most 
studies use extreme scores or median splits to classify participants as low or high in PFC, 
which do not provide a real estimate of the distribution of PFC in the population. Cialdini et 
al. (1995) state that in each of their three studies, more than half of the participants scored 
at or below the midpoint of the scale, which indicates that a large number of the population 
might have a low preference to be consistent. As the authors point out, this might account 
for error variance in a wide range of studies, not just the ones based on consistency-based 
phenomena.
Although the studies shared the use of a commitment manipulation, they often differed 
in whether they emphasized personal norms, group norms, attitudes, or self-concepts, or 
other possible motivators of behavior. At this point it is not possible to say which of the 
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possible mediators has the greatest effect on behavior. However, only by identifying pos-
sible mediators can we understand and improve commitment manipulations. A commit-
ment intervention aimed at increasing cognitive elaboration about the behavior might be 
combined with a reminder such as feedback, offers of additional information, and so on, 
to optimize positive elaboration. As another example, when researchers want to activate 
a group norm, they should take into consideration the dynamics of the groups and should 
make sure the commitment is made within a significant reference group, with which the 
participants identify, and that the commitment does not reflect superficial compliance with 
the request. To reduce superficial compliance, researchers might use in their meetings a 
technique called “guided group discussion” (werner, Sansone, & brown, 2008) to assure 
that members hear group support for the commitment and new behavior. Researchers 
could also encourage group members to hold regular discussions that might support the 
new behavior, help solve problems with the behavior, keep it salient, and so on (Staats, 
Harland, & wilke, 2004). Finally, when the goal is to address the self-concept, it appears to 
wise to combine the commitment with labelling the participants as “the kind of people who 
perform this behavior” rather than more general traits such as “good people.”
Summary and suggestions for future research
As becomes clear from the overview of studies, commitment manipulations in field studies 
yield mixed effects. Of the studies we reviewed, a small number report a clear-cut signifi-
cant main effect of commitment on behavior. The majority of the studies show that commit-
ment is effective only when combined with other interventions, see also Table 5.1.
we have seen that the manipulations itself and the way they are administered vary greatly 
across studies. For instance, in some studies participants are asked to sign a commitment 
form whereas in other studies the commitment is verbal. Most studies have participants 
make a commitment with only the experimenter present, while some explicitly manipulate a 
group commitment. we suggest when researchers design their commitment manipulation 
they take into account Cialdini’s (2001) recommendations; namely that commitments will be 
most effective when they are (1) active, (2) public, (3) effortful and (4) freely chosen. Active 
means that people have to do something to make the commitment, for instance signing a 
form. A written commitment is preferred over a verbal one (Pardini & Katzev, 1983-84). 
Public means that in order for the commitment to be effective, other people must be present 
when the commitment is made or the individual must believe that others will become aware 
of the commitment. According to Cialdini, commitments have to also be effortful, meaning 
that participants must exert some kind of effort in making the commitment. Finally, com-
mitments should be freely chosen, that is, participants should be under the impression that 








Related to the Cialdini (2001) criteria is the question of specificity: how specific must com-
mitment be in order to change behavior? Should researchers try and get participants to 
commit to a specific course of action or to a more general environmentalism? Although to 
the best of our knowledge no study has pitted these options against each other, research 
indicates that committing to a specific behavior yields best results. The studies reviewed 
that showed a positive effect on behavior change (Pallak and Cummings, 1976; wang & 
Katzev, 1990) used wording specifically describing a certain behavior.
In general, written commitments seem more effective than verbal ones (Pardini & 
Katzev, 1983-84). This might be because of the permanence: A written commitment serves 
as a (semi-)permanent reminder of that commitment. This aspect could be enhanced by 
leaving participants a copy of their signed form or leaving a reminder, such as a “thank you 
for your commitment” sticker or magnet.
This review revealed additional features that may have contributed to making the com-
mitment manipulation particularly successful. First, most of the researchers were careful 
to enhance the legitimacy of their program. In their spoken or written materials, they invoked 
local governments, particular service providers, environmental groups, the local college or 
university, and so on as the impetus for the program. Such legitimacy would make it difficult 
for people to reject the appeal without some consideration. Second, most of the programs 
provided a supportive physical environment for the new behavior (e.g., recycling bins with 
convenient pick-up; available public transit) or provided detailed written instructions and 
advice for being successful with the new behavior (e.g., ideas for conserving energy). Creat-
ing a supportive environment would be important for removing barriers that might under-
mine participants’ efforts to change their behaviors (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). Third, most 
researchers were careful to ask participants to commit to a specific behavior. Participants 
were not asked to commit to being a better person or to supporting environmental causes, 
but were asked to commit to recycling on particular days using a particular bin and location, 
using transit for their commute to work, and so on. we suspect that all of these features are 
essential for optimum program effectiveness, but of course, systematic research is needed 
to see which – if any – features are more effective and under what conditions.
In contrast, some aspects of manipulations may have undermined their effectiveness. 
For example, as noted previously, in the Shippee and Gregory (1982) study, combining com-
mitment with publicity appeared to have backfired in the strong commitment condition (i.e., 
publication of each firm’s failure to conserve energy appeared to undermine their efforts 
to conserve). A similar problem may have occurred in the DeLeon and Fuqua (1995) study, 
where weekly publication of each group’s recycling performance may have been discourag-
ing instead of encouraging.
Unfortunately, none of the studies we reviewed included manipulation checks on com-
mitment. This means we do not know the degree to which participants felt committed, if 
at all, to change their behavior. Future studies on commitment making should incorporate 
such manipulation checks so more insight can be gained in how effective these manipula-
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tions are and how they relate to behavioral change. Another weakness in the research is 
the lack of attention to real or perceived consequences for following through or failing to 
follow through on a commitment. Our opening remarks suggested that there are negative 
consequences for failing to follow through on a commitment; however that has not been 
specifically addressed in any of this research.
Conclusion
The existing literature in the domain of environmental psychology is generally highly posi-
tive about commitment making (e.g. De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993). Often it is presented 
as one of the most promising techniques to promote behavior change for both short- and 
long-term programs. In light of this positive and optimistic view, the current review may 
offer a more nuanced perspective. This chapter shows that out of the studies reviewed only 
4 showed a main effect of commitment. In all the other studies, commitment needed to be 
combined with another type of intervention in order to have an impact. As can be seen from 
Table 5.1, the majority of the studies did not measure long term behavior change. Most stud-
ies include a follow up measurement only a couple of weeks after the intervention. Of the 
studies that do include a long-term follow up, only one study (Pallak and Cummings, 1976; 
12 months) report a lasting significant change in behavior, while one (Matthies et al., 2006; 
25 weeks) reports a marginally significant long term effect.
The popularity of commitment manipulations resides in part in the idea that commitment 
leads to long-term, internalized changes. The psychological processes of attitude change 
and self-concept/personal norms are of interest because they reflect ways in which the new 
behavior can be maintained and eventually become a habit (e.g., Holland, Aarts, & Langen-
dam, 2006; Ouellette & wood, 1998; Verplanken & wood, 2006). Studies that yielded long-term, 
sustained change include Matthies et al. (2006), and Pallak and Cummings (1976), and both 
of these utilized self-concept/personal norm-related interventions that contributed to this 
increased internalization. Internalized norms are also of interest, as they reflect not mindless 
responding, but deliberate intentions to adhere to one’s values. In the environmental litera-
ture, we found two studies that tap into a pre-existing willingness to commit to sustainability. 
Heberlein and warriner (1983) measured family members’ personal norms about energy con-
servation (willingness to commit to conserving energy), and Montada, Kals and becker (2007) 
measured the relationship between “willingness for continued commitment” and behavioral 
intentions. both of these studies are tapping into commitment at a later point in the develop-
ment of permanent psychological and behavior change, and they both show that commitment 
is related to a number of different pro-environmental behaviors.
we began this literature review with describing the current popularity of commitment 
making initiatives. After reviewing the empirical support for this type of intervention, we 
have to conclude that the results are mixed. Few studies provided insights about the par-







can be studied, and have been addressed in non-environmental research. From the present 
group of studies, interventions that play on norms and self-concepts seem to yield the most 
robust findings.
The most important lesson to be learned here is that the different insights derived from 
fundamental research are not very well integrated in the environmental field. Commit-
ment manipulations used in field studies seem to address different constructs; while at the 
same time do not seem to be designed to aim at specific constructs. we suggest that future 
research into commitment should include measures of different possible mediators and 
tests which is/are most effective in producing behavior change. Then, with the knowledge 
from fundamental research, commitment manipulations can be improved to aim at specific 
constructs. At the same time, applied studies can then serve as important input to deepen 
our understanding of the underlying processes of commitment. A better understanding of 
the way commitment works will result in more successful tools that will help both research-
ers and professionals to stimulate pro-environmental behaviors.
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The main objective of the research described in this dissertation was to investigate whether 
and how commitment making can improve environmental behaviors. I have done so by per-
forming both field and laboratory research, and by reviewing the commitment literature. 
The field research focused on nature conservation as performed by Dutch farmers. In the 
previous chapters I have described a social-cognitive explanation for farmers’ motivation 
to perform nature conservation, showed that commitment making is effective in changing 
important aspects of nature conservation, investigated the conditions under which people 
are willing to make commitments, and described the processes through which commitment 
making can change environmental behavior. In this final chapter I will briefly summarize the 
most important findings in the studies described. I will then elaborate on the general impli-
cations of these findings, and finally I will end with suggestions for further research.
Summary of the main findings
In this thesis I have sought to investigate the process of commitment making as broadly as 
possible. To do so, I have used a multi-method approach: I have performed cross-sectional 
and quasi-experimental studies in the field, experimental studies in the laboratory, and a 
literature study.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on nature conservation performed by Dutch farmers. In Chap-
ter 2, a social-cognitive explanation of farmers’ motivation to perform conservation prac-
tices was offered. A distinction was made between conservation that is subsidized by the 
Dutch government, and conservation that is performed in the absence of monetary rewards. 
I used a model based on the Theory of Planned behavior (Azjen, 1991) to which the concept 
of self-identity and personal norm were added. Results showed that this model explained 
more variance in the intention to perform non-subsidized than subsidized nature conserva-
tion practices. Also, self-identity seemed to impact intention to perform non-subsidized but 
not subsidized nature conservation practices. It was shown that next to a reward-based 
motivation, farmers can simultaneously have an identity-based motivation to engage in 
nature conservation practices.
Chapter 3 dealt with an intervention package containing both public commitment making 
and the administration of tailored information, aimed at improving farmers’ nature conser-
vation. The participating farmers were divided in three groups: one group received tailored 
information only, one group received both tailored information and a public commitment 
manipulation, and one group received no treatment at all and thus served as a control. 
Relevant aspects of both subsidized and non-subsidized nature conservation were meas-
ured before and after the intervention took place. Tailored information was administered by 
creating feedback reports that were tailor made for each farm, based on self reported data 
on habitat area and management. The feedback was combined with tailored advices on how 







information plus commitment condition, participants were asked in a group of peers which 
of these advices they were going to follow up on in the next year. This way, a public commit-
ment manipulation was administered. Results showed that especially tailored information 
combined with public commitment making resulted in a stronger desire to engage in con-
servation, an increase in surface area of non-subsidized natural habitat, and an increase 
in time farmers spent on conservation. Participants who received only tailored information 
showed an increase in their surface area of non-subsidized natural habitat but did not show 
any change on our other measures. The intervention affected both subsidized and non-sub-
sidized conservation; however the effects were stronger for non-subsidized conservation.
In Chapter 4, I investigated the conditions under which people are willing to make com-
mitments. This is an important question, since the goal of this thesis was to investigate if 
and how commitment making can successfully promote environmental behavior. In order 
for commitment making to be successful, people first have to be willing to make commit-
ments. In this chapter we looked at commitment making as a structural solution to a social 
dilemma. Environmental issues such as nature conservation are, in essence, social dilem-
mas in which the individual needs are at odds with the group needs (see for example Joire-
man et al., 2001). In two experiments it was shown that people low in dispositional trust 
were in favor of contributing to a system of public commitment making when they had situ-
ation-specific information that others would contribute a lot to the realization of the public 
good. People high in dispositional trust showed the opposite pattern: They were in favor of 
contributing to a system of public commitment making when they had situation-specific 
information that others would not contribute a lot to the realization of the public good. This 
chapter showed that two types of trust, dispositional and situation-specific, are essential in 
predicting if people are willing to invest in public commitment making.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation consisted of a critical review of commitment making as 
an intervention in environmental research. Commitment making is generally seen as a 
very promising intervention technique (De Young, 1993; Dwyer et al., 1993). In this chapter, 
I reviewed the literature on the effectiveness of commitment, and found that while there 
are indeed studies that confirm the effect of commitment on behavior change, the overall 
results are mixed. Also, I noticed that the ways in which commitment manipulations are 
administered vary greatly among different studies. Most research does not pay attention to 
the processes through which commitment operates. based on more fundamental research, 
I proposed three different but not necessarily mutually exclusive routes through which 
commitment might change behavior. First, committing to a particular behavior might make 
people see this behavior as part of the self. People are generally motivated to behave in con-
gruence with their self-concept and may thus alter their behavior accordingly (bem, 1972). 
Second, the making of commitments might evoke a norm to adhere to this commitment. 
Such a norm can be either personal or social. Researchers often assume that commitment 
making should be done in public so that a social norm is evoked. However, research by Kerr, 
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Garst, Lewandowski, and Harris (1997) shows that people tend to adhere to previously made 
commitments even when there is no public surveillance. It might therefore very well be that 
personal norms underlie the process through which people change their behavior upon 
making a commitment to do so. Yet a third possible route lies in the attitudinal approach, 
whereby the making of a commitment keeps the behavior at hand salient and activates cog-
nitive processes such as “cognitive elaboration”, resulting in a strong en central attitude 
towards the behavior (werner et al., 1995). From the empirical studies investigated in this 
chapter it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions concerning the validity of any of these 
routes, although it looks as though commitment interventions that tap into norms or the 
self-concept are most successful.
General implications
The most important finding is this dissertation is that commitment making can be effective 
in promoting pro-environmental behavior. This is shown in different ways: by the quasi-
experimental field study on farmers’ nature conservation in Chapter 3, and by the literature 
review in Chapter 5. However, it also becomes clear that commitment making is no “quick 
fix”: Using commitment making as an intervention strategy requires careful consideration 
on the part of the researcher. As I argued in Chapter 5, there is great variation in the ways 
commitment manipulations are administered, and as such it should come as no surprise 
that effects of commitment making are mixed. I have attempted to shed some light on this 
issue by clarifying possible underlying mediators of the effect of commitment on behavior: 
self-concept, attitudes, and a normative process. As a general recommendation I believe 
researchers who are designing an intervention that contains commitment making should 
consider in great detail the environment they are working in. by environment, I mean the 
research setting, the target sample and the behavior at stake. Only by carefully examining 
these aspects and deciding which mediator a commitment manipulation should activate can 
a successful commitment manipulation be designed and administered.
Another implication from the current line of research is that giving tailored informa-
tion (including feedback) as an intervention strategy by itself may be not strong enough 
to produce actual behavior change. This follows from the results presented in Chapter 3, 
that show the greatest change occurred in the condition wherein people were given both 
tailored information and commitment. while tailored information alone was successful in 
producing an increase in surface area of non-subsidized natural habitat, the combination 
of tailored information and public commitment making yielded stronger effects on multiple 
dependent measures. The finding that especially the combination of these two intervention 
strategies was most successful corroborates findings in the literature that interventions 
packages that combine several manipulations are generally most prone to yield results 







strategies works, it would also be interesting to know how the separate strategies work 
and why they sometimes fail to produce results. Therefore it is important that we measure 
not only outcome variables on the behavioral level, but also possible social psychological 
underpinnings of those behaviors.
An important aspect of the current dissertation is that the field research described in 
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on nature conservation performed by farmers. This group is not 
usually targeted by social scientists (but see Fielding, Terry, Masser & Hogg, 2008, and 
Fielding et al., 2005). As I argued in Chapter 3, when designing an intervention it is impor-
tant to select a target behavior that has a significant impact on the environment. Farmers’ 
nature conservation practices have this significant impact and therefore I consider it highly 
relevant to study this behavior (see also Fish, Seymour, & watkins, 2003). This research 
thus contributes to the environmental psychology literature by introducing a fairly new tar-
get group as well as a new target behavior. Most published studies in this area of research 
deal with household behavior such as energy saving or recycling. These are behaviors that 
are relatively easy to perform. Nature conservation, however, is more complex than that. It 
covers a wide range of different behaviors such as mowing and planting. Not only do these 
behaviors vary greatly in difficulty, they are also to a varying extent contingent on more 
practical matters such as climate, subsidies, soil type, et cetera. This makes it harder to 
study and to intervene in these behaviors. Also, farmers as a target group are hard to reach: 
Very few studies have assessed farmers’ motivation towards biodiversity and conserva-
tion, and even fewer are successful in increasing it (Herzon & Mikk, 2007). This might be 
due to the fact that nature conservation practices can conflict with the economic goals that 
come with farming. In fact research has shown that goodness of fit between current farm 
management and conservation prescriptions are a key factor in farmers’ decisions (not) to 
participate in conservation (wilson & Hart, 2000). by distinguishing subsidized form non-
subsidized conservation practices the current research was able to show that economic 
factors are not solely responsible for decisions concerning conservation. For all these rea-
sons I consider the results I present in Chapter 3 very promising.
An assumption of the current research lies in the idea that environmental issues such as 
nature conservation are, in essence, social dilemmas. This implies that within these envi-
ronmental issues individuals are continuously faced with the decision to either pursue their 
own personal (short-term) interest, or the group’s (long-term) interest. Examples abound: 
Recycling, for instance, is unattractive for individuals since it is costly in terms of effort. 
Yet it is in the interest of the collective that many individuals recycle. In the case of farm-
ers, they have to decide whether to invest in nature conservation or not. The advantages of 
nature conservation, such as an increase in biodiversity, are enjoyed not solely by them per-
sonally, but by the collective as well. In order to understand such environmental issues, and 
to promote pro-environmental behavior, it is essential to understand the nature of social 
dilemmas (Vlek, 2000; Gifford & Hine, 1997).
 General Discussion 95
In the experimental social dilemma literature, it has been shown that commitment mak-
ing increases cooperation (Dawes, 1980; Kerr & Kaufmann-Gilliland, 1994; Kollock, 1998; 
Komorita & Parks, 1995). In more applied environmental psychology studies, it has been 
found that commitment making increases pro-environmental behavior (De Young, 1993; 
Dwyer et al., 1993). This is no coincidence when bearing in mind that, as I just argued, pro-
environmental behaviors are instances of cooperative behavior.
In this dissertation I have empirically shown that commitment is effective in promoting 
nature conservation. However, in order for any intervention program to be effective, peo-
ple have to be willing to participate in it. This willingness to engage in public commitment 
making has until now not been systematically investigated. In my research, specifically in 
Chapter 4, I identify the conditions under which people will be willing to make public com-
mitments. I do so by looking at commitment making as structural solution to social dilem-
mas. This approach enables me to make use of the literature on other structural solutions 
when identifying the conditions under which people are willing to put effort in commitment 
making and when they are not. The studies reported in Chapter 4 are a first attempt to shed 
light on this issue. with this knowledge the effectiveness of intervention programs in the 
environmental domain can hopefully be increased.
Suggestions for future research
After considering the general implications that result from the studies described in this dis-
sertation, it is now time to translate these implications into more tangible suggestions for 
future research. As argued above, my findings concerning the conditions under which peo-
ple are willing to make commitments can help increase the effectiveness of commitment 
interventions in the environmental domain. we now know that this willingness is dependent 
on the interplay of dispositional trust and situational expectations. Specifically, we know 
that people are willing to invest in public commitment making when their dispositional trust 
and situational expectations are incongruent. Researchers can use this information in the 
process of designing a commitment intervention, by carefully considering people’s situa-
tional expectations and the level of trust within the group, or by manipulating these by  giving 
people information about what to expect from others.
Another interesting pathway for future research would be to empirically test the routes 
through which commitment making alters environmental behavior. In Chapter 5, I pro-
pose three possible routes: self-concept, attitudes, and normative processes. based on 
the  literature, I conclude that there seems to be the greatest amount of evidence for self-
concept and norms to mediate the effect of commitment on behavior. However, in order 
to truly disentangle the three, it would be interesting to pit them against each other in an 
empirical commitment study. An example for such a study is offered by burger and Caldwell 







In this study, participants complied with a small request by signing a petition and writing 
a statement about problems of homelessness. After this, they completed a questionnaire 
measuring differences in self-concept related to feeling compassion and helping with wor-
thy causes. These participants described themselves as more willing to provide support 
and as more compassionate than a control group. Also, they were more likely to comply with 
the target request to volunteer with a food drive than the control group. Mediation analysis 
showed that the change in self-concept mediated the FITD effect. Such a study could be 
performed on commitment, in which case participants would first be asked to commit to a 
certain behavior, after which changes in self-concept would be measured as well as willing-
ness to actually perform the behavior.
Furthermore, in Chapter 2 it was shown that self-identity predicts farmers’ intentions to 
perform non-subsidized nature conservation. Self identity refers to a collection of identities 
derived from the various social roles someone occupies (Stryker, 1968) and thus closely 
resembles the notion of self-concept (bem, 1972), which refers to the idea that people infer 
their attitudes from their own behavior. Seen as how I argue that commitment can alter 
behavior through this self-concept, it seems plausible to hypothesize that in the case of 
farmers’ nature conservation, commitment manipulations can be improved by addressing 
the self-concept. Research by Cialdini et al. (1998) indicates that this can be done by com-
bining the commitment manipulation with a trait label. Labelling the participants as “the 
kind of people who perform this behavior” can counter the undermining effect of external 
justifications for behavior and make the self-concept salient. Therefore, for possible further 
interventions concerning farmers’ nature conservation, I recommend that commitment 
manipulations be combined with such trait labels.
Conclusion
The current line of research has shown that the making of public commitments is success-
ful in improving farmer’s nature conservation practices. This success is of course depend-
ent on people’s willingness to make such commitments. It appears people are willing to 
invest in commitment making when their general trust and situation-specific expectations 
are incongruent. The current research has also highlighted that there are three possible 
routes through which commitment may alter behavior: self-concept, attitudes, and norma-
tive processes.
what I have presented in this dissertation is a perspective on the entire process of com-
mitment making: under which conditions people engage in it, if it is successful in altering 
behavior, and how it is successful. by doing so, I hope to have contributed to the improve-
ment of public commitment making as a tool to promote pro-environmental behavior.
  97
References
Abrahamse, w., Steg, L., Vlek, C., & Rothengatter, T. (2005). A review of intervention studies aimed at 
household energy conservation. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 25, 273-291.
Abrahamse, w., Steg, L., Vlek, C., & Rothengatter, T. (2007). The effect of tailored information, 
goal setting, and tailored feedback on household energy use, energy-related behaviors, and 
behavioral antecedents. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 27, 265-276.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human decision Processes, 
50, 179-211.
Ajzen, I. & Fishbein (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (1999). Theory of planned behavior: Assessment of predictive validity 
and ‘perceived control’. British Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 35-54.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-analytic 
review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 471-499.
bachman, w., & Katzev, R. (1982). The effects of non-contingent free bus tickets and personal 
commitment on urban bus ridership. Transportation Research part A – Policy and Practice, 16, 
103-108.
bamberg S, Hunecke M, & blobaum A. (2007). Social context, personal norms and the use of public 
transportation: Two field studies. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 27, 190-203.
bamberg, S., & Möser, G. (2007). Twenty years after Hines, Hungerford, and Tomera: A new meta-
analysis of psycho-social determinants of pro-environmental behaviour. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 27, 14-25.
bamberg, S. (2002). Effects of implementation intentions on actual performance of new 
environmentally friendly behaviours: Results of two field experiments. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 22, 399-411.
baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986).The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
bem, D. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental  social 
psychology. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
benton, T. G., Vickery, J. A., & wilson, J. D. (2003). Farmland biodiversity: is habitat heterogeneity the 
key? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 18, 182-188.
blomqvist, M. M., Tamis, w. L. M., bakker, J. P., van der Meijden, E. (2006). Seed and (micro)site 
limitation in ditch banks: Germination, establishment and survival under different management 
regimes. Journal of Nature Conservation, 14, 16-33.
boatman, N. D., Davies, D. H. K., Chaney, K., Feber, R., De Snoo, G. R., and Sparks, T. H. (Eds.), (1999). 
Field margins and buffer zones: Ecology, management and policy. Aspects of Applied biology 54, 
The association of applied biologists, warwick, UK.
brehm, J. w. (1966). A theory of psychological reactance. New York: Academic Press.
brehm, J. w. (1972). Responses to loss of freedom: A theory of psychological reactance. Morristown, NY: 
General Learning Press.
burton, R. J. F, & wilson, G. A. (2006). Injecting social psychology theory into conceptualisations of 
agricultural agency: Towards a post-productivist farmer self-identity? Journal of Rural Studies, 
22, 95-115.
burton, R. J. F., Kuczera, C., & Schwarz, G. (2008). Exploring farmers’ cultural resistance to 
voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Sociologia Ruralis, 48, 16-37.
burton, R. J. F. (2004). Reconceptualising the “behavioural approach” in studies: a socio-
psychological perspective. Journal of Rural Studies, 20, 359-371.
burger, J. M. (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: A multiple-process analysis and 








burger, J. M., & Caldwell, D. F. (2003). The effects of monetary incentives and labelling on the foot-
in-the-door effect: evidence for a self-perception process. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 25, 
235-241.
burger, J. M., & Guadagno, R. E. (2003). Self-concept clarity and the foot-in-the-door procedure. 
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 25, 79-86.
burn, S. M., & Oskamp, S. (1986). Increasing community recycling with persuasive communication 
and public commitment. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,16, 29-41.
Chaiken, S. (1987). The heuristic model of persuasion. In M. P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, & C. P. Herman 
(Eds.), Social influence: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 5 (pp. 3-39). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Chen, X. P. (1996). The group-based binding pledge as a solution to public goods problems. 
Organizational Behavior and Human decision Processes, 66, 192-202.
Chen, X. P., & Komorita, S. S. (1994). The effects of communication and commitment in a public goods 
dilemma. Organizational Behavior and Human decision Processes, 60, 367-386.
Cialdini, R. b., Eisenberg, N., Green, b.L., Rhoads, K., & bator, R. (1998). Undermining the 
undermining effect of reward on sustained interest. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 
249-263.
Cialdini, R. b. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice. boston, MA: Allyn & bacon. 4th Ed.
Cialdini, R. b., Trost, M. R., & Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency – the development of a 
valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 69, 318-328.
Cobern, M. K., Porter, b. E., Leeming, F. C., & Dwyer, w. O. (1995). The effect of commitment on 
adoption and diffusion of grass cycling. Environment and Behavior, 27, 213-232.
Conner, M., & Armitage, C. J. (1998). Extending the theory of planned behavior: A review and avenues 
for further research. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 1429-1464.
Daamen, D. D. L., Staats, H., wilke, H. A. M., & Engelen, M. (2001). Improving environmental behavior 
in companies. The effectiveness of tailored versus non-tailored interventions. Environment and 
Behavior, 33, 229–248.
Dawes, R. M., van de Kragt, A. J., & Orbell, J. (1990). Cooperation for the benefit of us - Not me, or my 
conscience. In J. Mansbridge (Ed.), Beyond self interest (pp. 97-110) Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 13, 169-193.
Day without traffic jams. Retrieved October 17th, 2008, from www.denhaag.com.
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the 
effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 627-668.
DeJong, w. (1981). Consensus information and the foot-in-the-door-effect. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 7, 423-430.
DeLeon, I. G., & Fuqua, R. w. (1995). The effects of public commitment and group feedback on 
curbside recycling. Environment and Behavior, 27, 233-250.
De Snoo, G. R. (2006). benchmarking the environmental performances of farms. International Journal 
of Life Cycle Assessment, 11, 22-25.
De Young, R. (1993). Changing behavior and making it stick. The conceptualization and management 
of conservation behavior. Environment and Behavior, 25, 185-205.
Duelli, P. (1997). biodiversity evaluation in agricultural landscapes: An approach at two different 
scales. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 62, 81-91.
Dwyer, w.O., Leeming, F. C., Cobern, M. K., Porter, b. E., & Jackson, J. M. (1993). Critical review of 
behavioral interventions to preserve the environment: Research since 1980. Environment and 
Behavior, 25, 275-321.
Earth Month Chicago. Retrieved October 17th, 2008, from www.earthmonthchicago.com.
Environmental pledge proposed for graduation. Retrieved October 17th, 2008, from www.asuherald.
com.
European Commission, Directorate-General for agriculture (2003). Agriculture and the Environment. 
Retrieved November 26, 2008, from http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/index_en.htm
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE model as an 
integrative framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social  psychology, Vol. 23 
(pp. 75-109). New York, NY: Academic Press.
 References 99
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, 
and correlates of attitude accessibility. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: 
Antecedents and consequences (pp. 247-282). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fielding, K. S., Terry, D. J., Masser, b. M., bordia, P., & Hogg, M. A. (2005). Explaining landholders’ 
decisions about riparian zone management: The role of behavioural, normative, and control 
beliefs. Journal of Environmental Management, 77, 12-21.
Fielding, K. S., Terry, D. J., Masser, b. M., & Hogg, M. A. (2008). Integrating social identity theory and 
the theory of planned behaviour to explain decisions to engage in nature conservation practices. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 23-48.
Fielding, K. S., McDonald, R.,, & Louis, w. R. (2008). Theory of planned behaviour, identity and 
intentions to engage in environmental activism. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, 318-326.
Fish, R., Seymour, S., & watkins, C. (2003). Conserving English landscapes: land managers and agri-
environmental policy. Environment and Planning A, 35, 19-41.
Freedman, J. L., & Fraser, S. C. (1966). Compliance without pressure: The foot-in-the-door technique. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 195-202.
Frey, b. S. (1997). On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 427-439.
Gardner, G. T., & Stern, P. C. (2002). Environmental problems and human behavior. boston, MA: Pearson 
Custom Publishing. 2nd Ed.
Gifford, R., & Hine, D. w. (1997). Toward cooperation in commons dilemmas. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science, 29, 167-178.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans. American  
Psychologist, 54, 493-503.
Guadagno, R. E., Asher, T., Demaine, L. J., & Cialdini, R. b. (2001). when saying yes leads to saying 
no: Preference for consistency and the reverse foot-in-the-door effect. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 27, 859-867.
Habitat – definition. Retrieved December 4, 2008 from Http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/
Habitat
Harland, P., Staats, H. & wilke, H. A. M. (1999). Explaining pro-environmental intention and behavior 
by personal norms and the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29, 
2505-2528.
Harland, P., Staats, H. & wilke, H. A. M. (2007). Situational and personality factors as direct or 
personal norm mediated predictors of pro-environmental behavior: Questions derived from 
norm-activation theory. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29, 323-334.
Hartig, T., Mang, M., & Evans, G. (1991). Restorative effects of natural environment experiences. 
Environment and Behavior, 23, 3-26.
Heberlein, T. A., & warriner, G. K. (1983). The influence of price and attitude on shifting residential 
electricity consumption from on- to off-peak periods. Journal of Economic Psychology, 4, 107-130.
Herzon, I., & Mikk, M. (2007). Farmers’ perceptions of biodiversity and their willingness to enhance it 
through agri-environment schemes: A comparative study from Estonia and Finland. Journal for 
Nature Conservation, 15, 10-25.
Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & white, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity 
theory with social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58, 255-269.
Holland, R. w., Verplanken, b., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2002). On the nature of attitude-behavior 
relations: the strong guide, the weak follow. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 869-876.
Holland, R. w., Aarts, H., & Langendam, D. (2006). breaking and creating habits on the working floor: 
A field-experiment on the power of implementation intentions. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 42, 776-783.
Joireman, J. A., Van Lange, P. A. M., Van Vugt, M., wood, A., Van Der Leest, T., & Lambert, C. (2001). 
Structural solutions to social dilemmas: A field study on commuters’ willingness to fund 
improvements in public transit. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 504- 526.
Katzev, R. D., & Johnson, T. R. (1983). A social-psychological analysis of energy consumption: 
The impact of minimal justification techniques. Journal of Economic Psychology, 3, 267-284.
Katzev, R. D., & Pardini, A. (1987-88). The comparative effectiveness of reward and commitment in 








Katzev, R. D., & wang, T. (1994). Can commitment change behavior? A case study of environmental 
actions. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 9, 13-26.
Kerr, N. L., Garst, J., Lewandowski, D. A., & Harris, S. E. (1997). That still, small voice: Commitment 
to cooperate as an internalized vs. a social norm. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 
1300-1311.
Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1994). Communication, commitment, and cooperation in 
social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 513-529.
Kiesler, C. (1971). The psychology of commitment: Experiments linking behavior to belief. New York: 
Academic Press.
Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of  Sociology, 24, 
183-214.
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1995). Intergroup relations: Mixed-motive interaction. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 46, 183-207.
Krebs, J. R., wilson, J. D., bradbury, R. b., and Siriwardena, G. M. (1999). The second silent spring? 
Nature, 400, 611-612.
Krosnick, J. A., boninger, D. S., Chuang, Y. C., berent, M. K., & Carnot, C. G. (1993). Attitude strength: 
One construct or many related constructs? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 
1132-1151.
Lewin, K. (1947). Group decision and social change. In T. Newcomb & E. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in 
social psychology (pp 340-344). New York: Henry Holt.
Lokhorst, A. M., Van Dijk, E., & Staats, H. (2009). Public commitment making as a structural solution 
in social dilemmas. Journal of Environmental Psychology, manuscript accepted for publication.
Lokhorst, A. M., Van Dijk, J., Staats, H., Van Dijk, E., & De Snoo, G. R. (2009a). what’s in it for me? 
A social-cognitive explanation of motivational differences between farmers’ voluntary and 
subsidized nature conservation practices. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Lokhorst, A. M., Van Dijk, J., Staats, H., Van Dijk, E., & De Snoo, G. R. (2009b). Using tailored 
information and public commitment to improve the environmental quality of farm lands. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.
Lokhorst, A. M., werner, C. M., Staats, H., & Van Dijk, E. (2009). A review of commitment making 
strategies in environmental research. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Madonna plugs global warming activism on monster carbon tour. Retrieved October 17th, 2008, from 
www.ecorazzi.com
Manhoudt, A. G. E., Visser, A. J., De Snoo, G. R. (2007). Management regimes and farming practices 
enhancing plant species richness on ditch banks. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 119, 
353-358.
Matthies, E., Klockner, C. A., & Preissner, C. L. (2006). Applying a modified moral decision making 
model to change habitual car use: How can commitment be effective? Applied Psychology-an 
International Review, 55, 91-106.
McKenzie-Mohr, D. (2000). Promoting sustainable behavior: An introduction to community based 
social marketing. Journal of Social Issues, 56, 543-554.
Messick, D. M., wilke, H. A. M., brewer, M. b., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P., & Lui, L. (1983). Individual 
adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 44, 294-309.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Ecosystems and Human well-being – Synthesis. world 
Resources Institute (2005). Retrieved May 27, 2008, from www.wri.org.
Moan, I.S., & Rise, J. (2005) Quitting smoking: Applying an extended version of the theory of planned 
behavior to predict intention and behavior. Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research, 10, 39-68.
Montada, L., Kals, E., & becker, R. (2007). willingness for continued social commitment – 
A new concept in environmental research. Environment and Behavior, 39, 287-316.
Morris, C., & Potter, C. (1995). Recruiting the new conservationists: Farmers’ adoption of agri-
environmental schemes in the UK. Journal of Rural Studies, 11, 51-63.
Myers, J. L. (1972). Fundamentals of experimental design (2nd ed.). boston: Allyn & bacon. Oerlemans, 
N., Guldemond, J. A., & Visser, A. (2007). Meerwaarde agrarische natuurverenigingen voor 
de ecologische effectiviteit van Programma beheer: ecologische effectiviteit regelingen 
 References 101
natuurbeheer. [Added value of Agricultural organizations for the ecological effectivity of 
Programma beheer]. Retrieved June 12th, 2008, from library.wur.nl
Pallak, M., & Cummings, N. (1976). Commitment and voluntary energy conservation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 2, 27-31.
Pardini, A., & Katzev, R. (1983-84). The effect of strength of commitment on newspaper recycling. 
Journal of Environmental Systems, 13, 245-254.
Perugini, M., & bagozzi, R. P. (2001). The role of desires and anticipated emotions in goal-directed 
behaviours: broadening and deepening the theory of planned behaviour. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 40, 79-98.
Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude strength: 
Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. In R. E. Petty & J. 
A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 93-130). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to 
attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Ouellette, J. A., & wood, w. (1998). Habit and intention in everyday life: The multiple processes by 
which past behavior predicts future behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 54-74.
Schultz, P. w., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. b., Goldstein, N. J., & Griskevicius, V. (2007). The constructive, 
destructive and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychological Science, 18, 429-434.
Schwartz, S. H., & Howard, J. A. (1981). A normative decision-making model of altruism. In J.P. 
Rushton (Ed.), Altruism and helping behavior: Social, personality, and developmental perspectives 
(pp. 189-211). Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum.
Schwartz, S. H., & Howard, J. A. (1984). Internalised values as motivators of altruism. In E. Staub, D. 
bar-Tal, J. Karylowski, & J. Reykowski (Eds.), development and maintenance of prosocial behavior 
(pp. 229-256). New York: Plenum Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1968). words, deeds, and the perception of consequences and responsibility in action 
situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 232-242.
Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influences on altruism. In L. berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology, Vol. 10 (pp 221-279). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Shippee, G., & Gregory, w. (1982). Public commitment in energy conservation. American Journal of 
Community Psychology, 10, 81-93.
Smith, J. R., & McSweeney, A. (2007). Charitable giving: The effectiveness of a revised theory of 
planned behaviour model in predicting donating intentions and behaviour. Journal of Community 
and Applied Social Psychology, 17, 363-386.
Sparks, S., & Shepherd, R. (1992). Self-identity and the theory of planned behavior: Assessing the 
role of identification with ‘green consumerism’. Social Psychology Quarterly, 55, 388-399.
Sparks, P., & Guthrie, C. A. (1998). Self-identity and the theory of planned behavior: a useful addition 
or a helpful artifice? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 1393-1410.
Staats, H., Harland, P, & wilke, H. A. M. (2004). Effecting durable change: A team approach to 
improve environmental behavior in the household. Environment and Behavior, 36, 341-367.
Staats, H., Van Leeuwen, E., & wit, A. (2000). A longitudinal study of informational interventions to 
save energy in a office building. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 33, 101-104.
Staats, H. (2003). Understanding pro-environmental attitudes and behavior. An analysis and review 
of research based on the Theory of Planned behavior. In M. bonnes, T. Lee, & M. bonaiuto (Eds.), 
Psychological Theories for Environmental Issues (pp. 171-201). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Stern, P. C., & Oskamp, S. (1987). Managing scarce environmental resources. In D. Stokols and I. 
Altman (Eds.), Handbook of Environmental Psychology, Vol. 2. (pp 1043-1088). New York: wiley.
Stryker, S. (1968). Identity salience and role performance: The importance of symbolic interaction 
theory for family research. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 30, 58-564.
Terry, D. J., Hogg, M. A., & white, K. M. (1999). The theory of planned behaviour: Self-identity, social 
identity and group norms. British Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 225-244.
Thøgersen, J. (2006). Norms for environmentally responsible behaviour: An extended taxonomy. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 26, 247-261.
Van de Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes R. M. (1983). The minimal contributing sets as a solution 








Van Der Meulen, H. A. b., De Snoo, G. R., & wossink, G. A. A. (1996). Farmer’s perception of unsprayed 
crop edges in the Netherlands. Journal of Environmental Management, 47, 241-255.
Van Dijk, J., Lokhorst, A. M., Staats, H., & De Snoo, G. R. (2009). No pay, no cure? Subsidized and 
voluntary agri-environmental management on arable farms. Manuscript in preparation.
Van Dijk, E., & wilke, H. A. M. (1994). Conditional contributions and public good provision. In: U. 
Schulz, w. Albers, & U. Mueller (Eds.). Social dilemmas and Cooperation (pp. 173-185). berlin/
Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Van Dijk, E., & wilke, H. A. M. (1999). Conditional contributions and public good provision: 
Perceptions, motives and behavioral reactions. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2, 
245-258.
Van Dijk, E., wilke, H. A. M., & wit, A. (2003). Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas: Public 
good versus common resources dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 170-176.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Van Vugt, M., Meertens, R. M., & Ruiter, R. A. C. (1998). A social dilemma analysis 
of commuting preferences: The roles of social value orientation and trust. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 28, 796- 820.
Van Paassen, A., Schrieken, N. (1998). Handboek Agrarisch Natuurbeheer. [Handbook for agri-
environmental management]. Landschapsbeheer Nederland, Utrecht, The Netherlands [in 
Dutch].
Van Vugt, M., & Samuelson, C. D. (1997). The impact of personal metering in the management of a 
natural resource crisis: A social dilemma analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 
731-745.
Verplanken, b., & wood, w. (2006). Interventions to break and create consumer habits. American 
Marketing Association, 25, 90-103.
Vining, J., & Ebreo, A. (1992). Predicting recycling behaviour from global and specific environmental 
attitudes and changes in recycling opportunities. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 1580-
1607.
Vlek, C. (2000). Essential psychology for environmental policy making. International Journal of 
Psychology, 35, 153-167.
wang, T. E., & Katzev, R. D. (1990). Group commitment and resource conservation: two field 
experiments on promoting recycling. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20, 265-275.
weber, J. M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of decision making in social 
dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 281-
307.
weibull, A. C., Ostman, O., Granqvist, A., (2003). Species richness in agroecosystems: the effect of 
landscape, habitat and farm management. Biodiversity Conservation, 12, 1335-1355.
werner, C. M. (2003). Changing homeowners’ use of toxic household products: a transactional 
approach. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 23, 33-45.
werner, C. M., Turner, J., Shipman, K., Twitchell, S. F., Dickson, b. R., bruschke, G. V., & Von 
bismarck, w. b. (1995). Commitment, behavior, and attitude change: An analysis of voluntary 
recycling. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 15, 197-208.
werner, C. M., & Makela, E. (1998). Motivations and behaviors that support recycling. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 18, 373-386.
werner, C. M., Sansone, C., & brown, b. b. (2008). Group discussion and attitude change: The roles of 
normative and informational influence. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, 27-41.
wilson, G., & Hart, K. (2000). Financial imperative of conservation concern? EU farmers’ motivations 
for participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Environment and Planning A, 32, 2161-
2185.
Yamagishi, T. (1986a). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 51,110-116.
Yamagishi, T. (1986b). The structural goal/expectation theory of cooperation in social dilemmas. 
In E. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in Group Processes, 3, 51-87.
Yamagishi, T. (1988). The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 51, 265-271.
Yamagishi, T., Cook, K. S., & watabe, M. (1998). Uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the 
United States and Japan. American Journal of Sociology, 104, 165-194.
 References 103
Yamagishi, T., & Sato, K. (1986). Motivational bases of the public-goods problem. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 67-73.
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. 
Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129-166. 





Dit proefschrift gaat over het effect van het maken van publieke beloftes (public commit-
ments) op gedrag. Meer specifiek onderzoek ik in dit proefschrift of het maken van zulke 
beloftes effect heeft op agrarisch natuurbeheer. Daarnaast onderzoek en beschrijf ik het 
proces waarin publieke beloftes gedrag veranderen, en onderzoek ik onder welke omstan-
digheden mensen geneigd zijn om zulke beloftes te maken.
Publieke beloftes worden vaak ingezet als middel om milieuvriendelijk gedrag van men-
sen te stimuleren. Het maken van publieke beloftes houdt in dat mensen in het bijzijn van 
anderen beloven hun gedrag te veranderen. Deze techniek is al veel gebruikt in milieu-
psychologisch onderzoek. Aangetoond is dat mensen die publieke beloftes maakten, meer 
gingen recyclen (burn & Oskamp, 1986; DeLeon & Fuqua, 1995; wang & Katzev, 1990), min-
der energie gingen gebruiken (Pallak & Cummings, 1976), en vaker de auto lieten staan 
(Matthies et al., 2006).
In het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (Hoofdstuk 2) onderzoek ik 
de motivatie van boeren voor agrarisch natuurbeheer. Er wordt hierbij een onderscheid 
gemaakt tussen natuurbeheer dat door de Nederlandse overheid wordt gesubsidieerd, en 
natuurbeheer waarvoor de boer geen compensatie ontvangt. Om de intentie om aan natuur-
beheer te doen te voorspellen, maak ik gebruik van de Theory of Planned behavior (Azjen, 
1991), waaraan de variabelen persoonlijke norm en zelfidentiteit zijn toegevoegd. Deze stu-
die laat zien dat de intentie om aan gesubsidieerd beheer te doen wordt voorspeld door de 
attitude ten opzichte van dat beheer. De intentie om aan niet-gesubsidieerd beheer te doen 
wordt beter voorspeld door het gebruikte model, en wel door attitude, subjectieve norm en 
zelfi dentiteit. Hoewel er dus duidelijke verschillen zijn tussen gesubsidieerd en niet-gesub-
sidieerd beheer in termen van motivatie, sluit het een het ander niet uit: naarmate de inten-
tie om aan gesubsidieerd beheer te doen sterker is, is de intentie om aan niet-gesubsidieerd 
beheer te doen ook sterker.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een interventie getoetst die gericht is op het verbeteren van agra-
risch natuurbeheer. Deze interventie bevat zowel informatie (feedback) als een public com-
mitment manipulatie. De deelnemende boeren werden verdeeld over drie condities: een 
groep ontving alleen feedback, een groep ontving zowel feedback als de commitment mani-
pulatie, en een groep was de controle. Zowel voor als na de interventie werden relevante 
aspecten van natuurbeheer gemeten. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat met name de combinatie 
van feedback en commitment effectief is in het verbeteren van natuurbeheer. boeren die 















vergrootten hun oppervlakte niet-gesubsidieerde natuur, en gingen meer tijd besteden aan 
natuurbeheer. boeren die alleen feedback ontvingen, vergrootten ook hun oppervlakte niet-
gesubsidieerde natuur, maar lieten verder geen veranderingen zien. Over het geheel geno-
men waren de effecten van de interventie sterker voor niet-gesubsidieerd natuurbeheer 
sterker dan voor gesubsidieerd natuurbeheer.
Nu we, op basis van het huidige en ander onderzoek weten dat het maken van com-
mitments succesvol is in het veranderen van (milieu-relevant) gedrag, is het belangrijk 
te onderzoeken onder welke omstandigheden mensen bereid zijn zulke commitments te 
maken. In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik dit door het maken van commitments te zien als een 
structurele oplossing voor een sociaal dilemma. Zo’n dilemma ontstaat wanneer het eigen 
belang haaks staat op het belang van de groep. Veel milieuproblemen zijn in essentie soci-
ale dilemma’s. In het geval van agrarisch natuurbeheer moeten boeren kiezen of zij wil-
len investeren in het verbeteren van de natuur. De kosten daarvan dragen zij zelf, maar de 
opbrengsten, namelijk de verbeterde natuur, zijn voor iedereen. Dit is een typisch voorbeeld 
van een publiek goed dilemma, waarbij groepsleden zelf bepalen of en hoeveel ze bijdragen 
aan de realisatie van een goed waarvan iedereen de vruchten plukt. Een manier om zo’n 
dilemma op te lossen is de structuur van de situatie te veranderen; dit wordt een structu-
rele oplossing genoemd. Een voorbeeld van zo’n structurele oplossing is het aanstellen van 
een leider die bepaalt hoeveel iedereen bij moet dragen. In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer 
ik dat het maken van commitments ook een structurele oplossing is. De studies die in dit 
hoofdstuk worden beschreven laten zien dat mensen bereid zijn te investeren in het maken 
van commitments wanneer hun mate van dispositioneel vertrouwen en hun mate van situ-
atiespecifiek vertrouwen incongruent zijn. Dat wil zeggen dat mensen die van nature veel 
vertrouwen in anderen hebben, bereid zijn te investeren in het maken van commitments 
wanneer zij verwachten dat in het specifieke dilemma waarin ze zitten, mensen weinig 
zullen bijdragen aan het publieke goed. Voor mensen die van nature weinig vertrouwen in 
anderen hebben geldt het omgekeerde: zij zijn bereid te investeren in het maken van com-
mitments wanneer zij verwachten dat in het specifieke dilemma waarin ze zitten, mensen 
veel zullen bijdragen aan het publieke goed.
Hoofdstuk 5 biedt een overzicht van de verschillende manieren waarop publieke com-
mitments worden ingezet om milieuvriendelijk gedrag te stimuleren. In dit hoofdstuk onder-
zoek ik hoe het kan dat het maken van commitments invloed heeft op menselijk gedrag. Ik 
stel drie mogelijkheden voor. Ten eerste kan het zo zijn dat het maken van een commitment 
ervoor zorgt dat mensen het nieuwe gedrag zien als onderdeel van het zelf. Het maken van 
een commitment om bepaald gedrag te gaan vertonen leidt ertoe dat mensen zichzelf gaan 
zien als “het soort mensen die dit gedrag vertoont”. In dit geval loopt de relatie van het 
maken van commitments en gedrag via het zelfconcept.
Een tweede mogelijkheid is dat mensen een persoonlijke of sociale norm ervaren die 
voorschrijft dat je je houdt aan wat je hebt beloofd. Als het gaat om een sociale norm, houd 
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je je aan je commitment omdat anderen dat belangrijk vinden. wanneer het gaat om een 
persoonlijke norm, houd je je aan je commitment vanwege een persoonlijke overtuiging. 
Vaak wordt ervan uitgegaan dat mensen zich aan publieke commitments houden vanwege 
de sociale norm; echter, onderzoek van Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, and Harris (1997) laat 
zien dat mensen zich aan beloftes houden ook al er niemand aanwezig om ze op het eventu-
ele verbreken ervan te betrappen.
Ten derde kan het ook zo zijn dat het maken van een publieke commitment het onder-
werp waar het om gaat extra saillant maakt; dat de commitment zelf mensen aan dit onder-
werp herinnert. Mensen gaan dan bewuster nadenken over het gedrag waar het om gaat en 
dit proces leidt tot een sterke en centrale attitude ten opzichte van het gedrag.
Ik onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk of de milieupsychologische studies die een effect van 
het maken van publieke beloftes op gedrag rapporteren, ook aanwijzingen geven voor wat 
betreft de drie voorgestelde processen. Ik kom tot de conclusie dat voor geen van drieën 
sterk empirisch bewijs is, maar dat het lijkt dat zelfconcept en normatieve overwegingen 
een belangrijke rol spelen.
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen van het huidige onderzoek beschre-
ven. Ook beschrijf ik hier de algemene conclusies en aanbevelingen die voortvloeien uit 
deze dissertatie. Samenvattend laat dit onderzoek zien dat het maken van commitments 
succesvol kan zijn in het verbeteren van milieurelevant gedrag, in het bijzonder agrarisch 
natuurbeheer. Dit succes is uiteraard afhankelijk van de bereidheid van mensen om zulke 
commitments te maken. Het blijkt dat mensen geneigd zijn te investeren in het maken van 
commitments wanneer hun mate van dispositioneel vertrouwen en hun mate van situatie-
specifiek vertrouwen incongruent zijn. Daarnaast laat dit onderzoek zien dat er drie moge-
lijke routes zijn waardoor het maken van commitments gedragsverandering teweeg brengt: 
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